Roger,

It is the compactified dimensions that are the monads, not the strings.
Obviously you did not read and /or understand all I have been telling you.
Richard

On Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 12:12 PM, Roger <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  Hi Richard Ruquist
>
> 1) The is no master string to govern the strings,
> so strings are unlike monads.
>
> 2) Strings are theoretical constructions, which have no meanings.
>     Monads have meanings derived from the bodies they refer to.
>     This goes way beyond algebra.
>
> 3) Monads can perceive (although indirectly) and act (although indirectly).
>     They are agents. Strings are not agents and have none of these
> qualities.
>
> 4) Monads are alive, are homunculi, strings are not.
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/18/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-18, 10:50:37
> *Subject:* Re: Russell's possibly defective understanding of Leibniz. Or
> was itLeibniz's fault ?
>
>  Roger,
> In string theory the monads are responsible for the creation of space via
> compactification of the extra dimensions of space. I have never understood
> why, especially on the Mind/Brain forum where we already went thru all of
> you present thinking, why you never accepted the compact manifolds of
> string theory as the basis of Leibniz's monads. Instead you just decided
> the monads were mathematical and not substantial.
> Richard
>
> On Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 10:41 AM, Roger <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>>  Admittedly, the more I dig into Leibniz, the more questions I have.
>> But I won't abandon him yet, thinking I misunderstood one of his
>> statements. Or perhaps Russell misunderstood what Leibniz meant.
>>  According to Russell, "Complete set of predicates" means "sufficient,
>> complete in a minimal sense".
>> Like "sufficient reason" I suppose. Or Occam's razor. Or the truth should
>> be simple. Thus "Socrates was a man" is a proposition which is, as a
>> proposition,
>> thus a substance. This is tied into necessary reason, always either true
>> or false.
>> So I think the better definition is "Complete and unchanging set of
>> predicates"
>>  So because "The horse was lame" may not always have been true,
>> it is possibly contingent (is only a current fact), so as a proposition
>> it cannot be a substance as far as we know.
>>   None of this can be true, however, since most things will change with
>> time.
>> The conclusion is that Russell may be wrong, that nothing be a
>> substance.
>> Yet Leibniz says the universe is made up
>> entirely of monads, and monads are substances by definition.
>>  "For *Leibniz*, the universe is *made* up of an infinite number of
>> simple substances *...* "
>>  Perhaps Leibniz meant "the world I refer to in my philosophy..."
>> He did not count time and space for excample as monads.
>>    Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/18/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-18, 09:51:15
>> *Subject:* Re: Cs. Knowing that one knows.
>>
>>
>>  On 18 Aug 2012, at 14:47, Roger wrote:
>>
>>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>>  Being might be defined as =, meaning "is". It is a state, not a thing.
>> Then if a state, it is a state relative to some other state. L says that
>> a more
>> dominant monad (superior state) will act on and will always act on a
>> less dominant monad. Darwinism, if you like, before Darwin.
>> Survival of the fittest.
>>
>>
>> Hmm... May be the monads would be better described by the universal
>> numbers/machines. But it is only in a very local sense, embedded in some
>> computation(s), than we can give sense to "survival" of the fittest.
>>
>>
>>
>>  There may indeed be problems with understanding what Leibniz's
>> substance is.
>>
>> Benson Mates, in his book "The Philosophy of Leibniz" says that he,
>> Mates, does
>> not understand what Leibniz's substance is ! Mates teaches philosophy at
>> Berkeley.
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>     What is certain is that L's substance is not physical, it is
>> logical, but points to something
>> outside of itself. So "mind" as a word is a substance, it is real
>> pointing to the phenomenal mind,
>> the phenomenal mind being the experiencing consciousness.
>>
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>   Bertrand Russell has written a book on Leibniz's logic, and I think he
>> defines substance there as
>> anything with a complete set of predicates. IMHO Easy to say, hard to
>> kanow when you have a complete set.
>>
>>
>> Complete in which sense?
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>   Also, predicates such as "man" in "Socrates was a man" are said to be
>> (logically ) inside the subject "Socrates" .
>>  Also, a subject or substance cannot be a predicagte, a predicate cannot
>> be a subject.
>>  I tend to think of substances as kingdoms. Complete in their own selves.
>>   Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/18/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-18, 06:51:36
>> *Subject:* Re: Cs. Knowing that one knows.
>>
>>
>>  On 17 Aug 2012, at 22:26, Roger wrote:
>>
>>   1) For wine-tasting -- What one must have is knowing that one knows
>> that the wine tastes good.
>>   Such as one can prove that 1+1 =2 but one still has to accept that as
>> true.
>>
>>
>> Yes. In fact the proof that "1+1=2" will lead to the truth of "1+1=2",
>> for you, if you agree on the truth of the axioms you re using, and if you
>> believe that the rules of inference of your theory preserves truth.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>   *2) mo穘ad (mnd)*
>> *n.*
>> *1. Philosophy An indivisible, impenetrable unit of substance viewed as
>> the basic constituent element of physical reality in the metaphysics of
>> Leibniz.*
>> **
>> **
>> *Substance:* A being that subsists by itself; a separate or distinct
>> thing.
>>
>>
>> OK, but what is a being? This notion of subtance beg the question.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Contingent truth:* A truth whose opposite is possible
>>
>>
>> OK. In modal logic p is contingent will be written p & D~p. (or p & <> ~p
>> (~ = NOT)).
>> Or p & ~Bp (p & ~[]p)
>>
>>
>> *Entelechy:* Something having in it "a certain perfection", a
>> completeness- a term taken from Aristotle's definition of the soul
>>
>>
>> Hmm... "certain perfection" is rather fuzzy.
>>
>>
>>   *Appetition: *The internal principle which prepares for change;
>> rudimentary "desire".
>> *Monad:* The simple substance. Blind and passive by itself, but obtains
>> its perceptions
>> from God who also can animate it and cause it to feel.
>>
>>
>> I can make sense of this, perhaps in too much incompatible ways, in comp.
>> But OK.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/17/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-16, 11:40:34
>> *Subject:* Re: ?
>>
>>
>>  On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:21, Roger wrote:
>>
>>    BRUNO: I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a
>> virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid.
>>  ROGER: What point ? And emulate in what sense ? Ie could a computer
>> ever be a good wine taster ?
>>
>>
>> As I said, it seems they are. the french have succeeded in making a wine
>> testing machine which according to experts in the field is better than the
>> average qualified wine tester.
>> Does such machine get the human qualia of drinking wine. i doubt so, for
>> this you need to have a longer human history, and higher reflexive
>> abilities. But there is no reason why machine could'n get them in principle
>> (obvious for a computationalist which bet that he is himself a machine
>> relatively to its more probable neighborhood).
>>
>>
>>
>>    BRUNO: If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an
>> infinite regression.
>>  ROGER: Infinite regression of what ? Consciousness ? The monad does
>> away with that problem,
>> except of course it's just philosophy, not hardware.
>>
>>
>> It might be math, also. Could you explain what a monad is without too
>> much jargon?
>>
>>
>>    BRUNO: It might have a solution, but it begs the question of
>> comp/non-comp, and you are just saying
>> (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are
>> substantial actual infinities.
>>  ROGER: I think I said and believe what you said I said, but I don't
>> understand your main point
>> just above, even vaguely. At any rate, emulation is not the real thing.
>>
>>
>> If the brain is a universal emulator, as it surely is at least, then when
>> a computer emulates an emulation done by the brain, at the right level,
>> emulation is the real thing.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>   Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/16/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-15, 03:53:59
>> *Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to
>> computersinAIordescribing life
>>
>>
>>  On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote:
>>
>>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>>  You say, "a non living computer can supported a living self-developing
>> life form"
>>  Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ?
>>
>>
>> I mean "support". Sorry.
>> I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual
>> self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid.
>> If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite
>> regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of
>> comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines
>> cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>    Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/14/2012
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-12, 05:17:45
>> *Subject:* Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers
>> inAIordescribing life
>>
>>
>>  On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote:
>>
>>  Hi Russell Standish
>>  When I "gave in" to the AI point of view that computers can posess
>> intelligence,
>> I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only
>> living things can experience the world.
>>
>>
>>
>> You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living
>> self-developing life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex
>> substances are at play in the mind.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
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