Roger:

 

I suggest that at root, you have vitalist sympathies.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2012 4:07 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

 

Hi meekerdb 

 

IMHO I don't think that computers can have intelligence

because intelligence consists of at least one ability:

the ability to make autonomous choices (choices completely

of one's own). Computers can do nothing on their own,

they can only do what softward and harfdware tells them to do. 

 

Another, closely related, reason, is that there must be an agent that does
the choosing,

and IMHO the agent has to be separate from the system.

Godel, perhaps, I speculate. 

 

 

Roger Clough,  <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net> rclo...@verizon.net

8/27/2012 

Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."

----- Receiving the following content ----- 

From: meekerdb <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>  

Receiver: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>  

Time: 2012-08-26, 14:56:29

Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

 

On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>> I agree different implementations of intelligence have different
capabilities and 
>> roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any
intelligence (so long 
>> as infinities or true randomness are not required).
>
> And now a subtle point. Perhaps.
>
> The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence
EVEN if 
> infinities and true randomness are required for it.
>
> Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the
form of a some 
> non compressible sequence 11101000011101100011111101010110100001... (say)
>
> Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my
substitution level, 
> because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into
a finite 
> string. So such sequence operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor
copy me at the 
> right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right "interface" to
the oracle, so I 
> will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that
oracle.
>
> Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of
that oracle?
>
> Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in
this case, he 
> will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of
all finite 
> approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person
indeterminacy will have 
> as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my
virtual brain 
> use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.
>
> A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a
computation 
> requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.

That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical
world and 
consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides
essential 
interactions with consciousness as a computational process. Of course that
doesn't 
require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too.

Brent

>
> Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp
would be just 
> false, and the brain need an infinite interface.
>
> The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even
infinite non 
> computable one.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>

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