sorry:

What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY POSSIBL to create a robot with the
same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my
side.

2012/8/29 Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>

> That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you
> perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says
> that he perceive"..
>
> From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith
>
> What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same
> functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.
>
>
> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
>
>>  Hi Alberto G. Corona
>>
>> The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
>>
>> For example, consider:
>>
>> "I see the cat."    Here:
>>
>> I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
>>
>> When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal,
>> as are all subjective
>> states and all experiences.
>>
>> However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated
>> the experience
>> into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal
>> experience into a
>> publicly accessible statement.
>>
>> All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words
>> are objective.
>> Any statement is then objective.
>>
>> Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective,
>> so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless
>> (codeless).
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/29/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 10:39:37
>> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
>>
>>
>>
>> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>>
>>>  On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>>
>>> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has
>>> memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral.
>>> therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits
>>> with others.
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Albert,
>>>
>>> Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and
>>> how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself
>>> to be."
>>>
>>>
>>> in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation)
>> operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes
>> from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others
>> see on me.
>>
>>>
>>> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life
>>> of ourselves.
>>>
>>>
>>> No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the
>>> sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for
>>> each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like
>>> to be you.
>>>
>>> That′s why this uniqueness is not essential
>>
>>>
>>>  But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to
>>> other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come
>>> to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although
>>> this probably will never happen.
>>>
>>>
>>> Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur.
>>> There is something important to this!
>>>
>>
>> This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of
>> individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But
>> probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate
>> further....
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>>>
>>>>  On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Craig Weinberg
>>>>  I agree.
>>>>  Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
>>>>  Cs = subject + object
>>>>  The subject is always first person indeterminate.
>>>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
>>>>  QED
>>>>
>>>> Hi Roger,
>>>>
>>>> It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted
>>>> to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the
>>>> object is possibly singular.
>>>>
>>>>    Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>>> 8/29/2012
>>>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>>>> everything could function."
>>>>
>>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>>>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
>>>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary
>>>>
>>>>  This sentence does not speak English.
>>>>
>>>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
>>>>
>>>> s l u ,u s
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help
>>>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
>>>>
>>>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as
>>>> ascertaining the origin of awareness.
>>>>
>>>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless
>>>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation
>>>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular
>>>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
>>>>
>>>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of
>>>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non
>>>> comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only
>>>> negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is
>>>> that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion,
>>>> and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic
>>>> system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself
>>>> completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough
>>>> understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is
>>>> enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end
>>>> as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume
>>>> consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic
>>>> logic.
>>>>
>>>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of
>>>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this
>>>> or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary
>>>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place
>>>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
>>>>
>>>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to
>>>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative
>>>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another
>>>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure
>>>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not
>>>> follow from quanta.
>>>>
>>>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method
>>>> of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining
>>>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would
>>>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between
>>>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial
>>>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the
>>>> entropy of the totality.
>>>>
>>>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from
>>>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences,
>>>> for direct participation?
>>>>
>>>> Craig
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>>
>>> --
>>> Onward!
>>>
>>> Stephen
>>> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
>>>
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