On 31 Aug 2012, at 14:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, August 31, 2012 4:47:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Aug 2012, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:






Sense is irreducible.

From the first person perspective. Yes. For machine's too.


No software can control anything, even itself, unless something has the power to make sense of it as software and the power to execute that sense within itself as causally efficacious motive.

This seems to me like justifying the persistence of the physical laws by invoking God. It is too quick gap filling for me, and does not explain anything, as relying on fuzzy vague use of words. I might find sense there, but in the context of criticizing mechanism, I find that suspicious, to be frank.

I'm only explaining what comp overlooks. It presumes the possibility of computation without any explanation or understanding of what i/o is.

?


How does the programming get in the program?

Like the number 67589995004 get into arithmetic. By the consequence of addition and multiplication law. It is not obvious, but well explained in good textbook in logic.






Why does anything need to leave Platonia?

OK. (comp entails indeed that we have never leave Platonia, but again, this beg the question: why do you think anything has even leave Platonia? Physics is just Platonia seen from inside, from some angle/pov).


By "Seen from inside" you evoke a Non-Platonia.
Why does Platonia need a Physics view? Why should that possibility even present itself in a Platonic universe?

It does not. It does as a collective hallucination by numbers. But you need computer science to get that point clearly.






How does encoding come to be a possibility

Because it exists provably once you assume addition and multiplication, already assumed by all scientists.

If I begin with numbers and then add and multiply them together to get other numbers, where does the decoding come in?

It is long to explain, but the statement that the machine number Nu, in some enumeration of the partial computable function, stops on the number X is equivalent with the following arithmetical and polynomial relations:

phi_Nu(X) converges (the machine Nu stops when applied to the input X) iff


BEGIN:

Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y

ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2

Qu = B^(5^60)

La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5

Th +  2Z = B^5

L = U + TTh

E = Y + MTh

N = Q^16

R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
         + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)

P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2

(P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2

4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2

K = R + 1 + HP - H

A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2

C = 2R + 1 Ph

D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga

D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1

F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1

(D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1

END

Xa^3 is an abbreviation of Xa * Xa * Xa, so you can see arithmetic naturally describes, complex computer science relations, in the language {s, 0, +, *}. See Matiyasevic book for more, and notably explicit arithmetical form for decoding and encoding.

Those relation are true or false independently of me, and you, and define a universal dovetaling in pure arithmetic.




At what point do they suddenly turn into letters and colors and shapes and people?

When Nu represent the brain of a human being, and X an input of similar to the imput you get in the eyes when looking something colored. (I use comp, of course: I answer in the theory I am working in).



Why would they do that from an arithmetic perspective?

Why do 3 divides 9?



We are not tempted to do this in a computer. We don't think 'maybe this program will run faster if we play it a happy song through tiny speakers in the microprocessor'. Even plants have been shown to benefit from being interacted with positively, but have computations shown any such thing? Has any computer program shown any non- programmatic environmental awareness at all?

This is not reasoning. You can't compare today machine, with humans who have a very long history. But such history is in arithmetic (trivially).








and why should it be useful in any way (given a universal language of arithmetic truth).

?
Why should it be useful?

Are babies useful? Are the ring of Saturn useful?

No. They aren't. That's my point. Those things would never arise from number crunching alone.

Indeed. But the hallucination of babies and Saturn rings do.



Numbers begat only more numbers. If you apply numbers to forms, then you get interesting forms. If you apply interesting colors, sounds, etc. But numbers will never discover these things. We discover them. Real things discover numbers, not the other way around.

We are relative numbers. You just asserts that we are not. We agree to disagree on that possibility.







Comp doesn't account for realism, only a toy model of realism which is then passed off as genuine by lack of counterfactual proof - but proof defined only by the narrow confines of the toy model itself. It is the blind man proving that nobody can see by demanding that sight be put into the terms of blindness.

You don't give a clue why it would be like that, except building on the gap between 1 and 3 view, but my point is that universal machine or numbers are already astonished by such gap. They can only say that they live it without being able to justify it, nor even to define precisely what their 1-view can be, until they bet on mechanism, and understand (already) why it has to be like that.

Why do you think that I don't have a clue about epistemology but you claim to speak for the feelings and experiences of universal machines? Justification is a 3p epistemology. 1p doesn't need to prove itself in 3p because they are orthogonal to each other. 1p would need proof that it needs proof for itself. It is a given. You have to start somewhere - the cosmos has to have some point of orientation, and 1p is the name we can call that.

I just said that you affirm comp is false, without arguing why, except by saying we can do this and that, and that machines can't, but this means that we are not Turing emulable, and you fail to show me what is not Turing emulable in humans. You point on the feeling, but the feeling are, in comp, model by Bp & p, and Bp & p is not Turing emulable for the machines too, refuting your invalidity claim on comp.

Bruno




Craig



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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