Hi Bruno Marchal 

Are you saying that comp creates and controls all by means of some kind of code
in some Pythagorean realm, where all is numbers ? That everything is computable 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-31, 10:27:35
Subject: Re: Two reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence

On 31 Aug 2012, at 14:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, August 31, 2012 4:47:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Aug 2012, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, August 30, 2012 1:11:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Aug 2012, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 1:22:38 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:

Cells are indeed controlled by software (as represented in wetware form ? i.e. 
It isn't really clear exactly what controls what in a living cell. I can say 
that cars are controlled by traffic signals, clocks, and calendars.

To whatever we ascribe control, we only open up another level of unexplained 
control beneath it. What makes DNA readable to a ribosome? What makes anything 
readable to anything?

Encoding and decoding, or application and abstraction, or addition and 
multiplication, ...

My problem is that this implies that a pile of marbles know how many marbles 
they are. 

Not necessarily. A n-piles of marbles can emulate a m-pile of marbles.

I could rig up a machine that weighs red marbles and then releases an equal 
weight of white marbles from a chute. Assuming calibrated marbles, there would 
be the same number, but no enumeration of the marbles has taken place. Nothing 
has been decoded, abstracted, or read, it's only a simple lever that opens a 
chute until the pan underneath it gets heavy enough to close the chute. There 
is no possibility of understanding at all, just a mindless enactment of 
behaviors. No mind, just machine.

To be viable, comp has to explain why these words don't speak English.

It is hard to follow your logic. Like someone told to you, a silicon robot 
could make the equivalent argument: explain me how a carbon based set of 
molecules can write english poems ...

By your logic, I would have to explain how Bugs Bunny can't become a person 

It can. In some universal environment, it is quite possible that bugs bunny 
like beings become persons. 

As far as we know, we can't survive on any food that isn't carbon based. As far 
as we know, all living organisms need water to survive. 

On our planet, but you extrapolate too much.

Why should this be the case in a comp universe?

Open and hard problem, but a priori, life can takes different forms.

I think that the problem is that you don't take your own view that physical 
matter is not primitive seriously. Like you, I see matter not as a stuff that 
independently exists, but as a projection of the exterior side of bodies making 
sense of each other - or the sense of selves making an exterior side of body 
sense to face each other. From that perspective it isn't the carbon that is 
meaningful, the carbon (H2O, sugars, amino acids, lipids really), the carbon is 
just the symptom, the shadow. Carbon is the command line 'OPEN BIOAVAILABILITY 
DICTIONARY" which gives the thing access to the palette of histories associated 
with living organisms rather than astrophysical or geological events.

This is not inconsistent with comp, but I don't find this plausible. In fact I 
believe that all civilisation in our physical universe end up into a giant 
topological computing machinery (a quark star, whose stability depends on 
sophisticated error tolerant sort of quantum computation) virtualising their 
past and future. Carbon might be just a step in life development. We might 
already be virtual and living in such a "star". But more deeply, we are already 
all in arithmetic.


Sense is irreducible. 

>From the first person perspective. Yes. For machine's too.

No software can control anything, even itself, unless something has the power 
to make sense of it as software and the power to execute that sense within 
itself as causally efficacious motive.

This seems to me like justifying the persistence of the physical laws by 
invoking God. It is too quick gap filling for me, and does not explain 
anything, as relying on fuzzy vague use of words. I might find sense there, but 
in the context of criticizing mechanism, I find that suspicious, to be frank.

I'm only explaining what comp overlooks. It presumes the possibility of 
computation without any explanation or understanding of what i/o is. 


How does the programming get in the program?

Why does anything need to leave Platonia? 

OK. (comp entails indeed that we have never leave Platonia, but again, this beg 
the question: why do you think anything has even leave Platonia? Physics is 
just Platonia seen from inside, from some angle/pov).

By "Seen from inside" you evoke a Non-Platonia. Why does Platonia need a 
Physics  view? Why should that possibility even present itself in a Platonic 

How does encoding come to be a possibility 

Because it exists provably once you assume addition and multiplication, already 
assumed by all scientists.

If I begin with numbers and then add and multiply them together to get other 
numbers, where does the decoding come in? At what point do they suddenly turn 
into letters and colors and shapes and people? Why would they do that from an 
arithmetic perspective? We are not tempted to do this in a computer. We don't 
think 'maybe this program will run faster if we play it a happy song through 
tiny speakers in the microprocessor'. Even plants have been shown to benefit 
from being interacted with positively, but have computations shown any such 
thing? Has any computer program shown any non-programmatic environmental 
awareness at all?

and why should it be useful in any way (given a universal language of 
arithmetic truth). 

Why should it be useful?

Are babies useful? Are the ring of Saturn useful? 

No. They aren't. That's my point. Those things would never arise from number 
crunching alone. Numbers begat only more numbers. If you apply numbers to 
forms, then you get interesting forms. If you apply interesting colors, sounds, 
etc. But numbers will never discover these things. We discover them. Real 
things discover numbers, not the other way around.

Comp doesn't account for realism, only a toy model of realism which is then 
passed off as genuine by lack of counterfactual proof - but proof defined only 
by the narrow confines of the toy model itself. It is the blind man proving 
that nobody can see by demanding that sight be put into the terms of blindness.

You don't give a clue why it would be like that, except building on the gap 
between 1 and 3 view, but my point is that universal machine or numbers are 
already astonished by such gap. They can only say that they live it without 
being able to justify it, nor even to define precisely what their 1-view can 
be, until they bet on mechanism, and understand (already) why it has to be like 

Why do you think that I don't have a clue about epistemology but you claim to 
speak for the feelings and experiences of universal machines? Justification is 
a 3p epistemology. 1p doesn't need to prove itself in 3p because they are 
orthogonal to each other. 1p would need proof that it needs proof for itself. 
It is a given. You have to start somewhere - the cosmos has to have some point 
of orientation, and 1p is the name we can call that.




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