Hi Roger Clough,

Hi Bruno Marchal

Perhaps I am misguided, but I thought that comp was moreorless
a mechanical model of brain and man activity.


Not really. Comp is the hypothesis that there is a level of description of my brain or body such that I can be emulated by a computer simulating my brain (or body) at that level of description. Comp is neutral on the level. It might be a very low level like if we needed to simulate the entire solar system at the level of string theory, or very high, like if we were the result of the information processing done by the neurons in our skull.

Comp entails that NO machine can ever be sure about its substitution level (the level where we survive through the digital emulation), and so comp cannot be used normatively: if we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, and thus "saying yes" to the digitalist doctor for an artificial brain demands some act of faith. It is a theological sort of belief in reincarnation, even if technological. It is theotechnology, if you want. No one can imposes this to some other.

Then I show that comp leads to Plato, and refute Aristotle metaphysics. There are no ontological physical universe. the physical universe emerges from a gluing property of machines or number's dream. The physical universe appears to be a tiny facet of reality.

The proof is constructive and show how to derive physics from machine's dream theory (itself belonging to arithmetic); but of course this leads to open problems in arithmetic. What has been solved so far explains already most of the quantum aspect of reality, qualitatively and quantitatively. The approach explains also why from the number's points of view, quanta and qualia differentiate.

The work is mainly a complete translation of a part of the 'mind-body problem' into a 'belief in matter problem' in pure arithmetic.


I obviously need to peruse your main idea .
Do you have a link ?

The more simple to read in english is probably the sane04:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

best,

Bruno



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/31/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-31, 09:56:27
Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)


On 31 Aug 2012, at 12:03, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

According to Einstein, space doesn't exist per se.
Remarkably, Leibniz also came this conclusion back in the 17th century.


I agree. And with comp nothing physical exists per se, as some platonists and mystics often asserts.

Bruno




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/31/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-30, 18:16:32
Subject: Re: Technological (Machine) Thinking and Lived Being (Erlebnis)



On Thursday, August 30, 2012 2:00:49 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
On 8/30/2012 1:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing
> but experience.

  Hi Craig,

     I would say that time is the sequencing order of experience. The
order of simultaneously givens within experience is physical space.

I can go along with that. It's hard to know whether that sequencing arises as a function of space. It takes us years to develop a robust sense of time and it is hard to know how much of that is purely neurological maturation and how much has to do with the integration of external world events. For example, if you had a dream journal and I read you five dreams randomly from 1982 until now, I don't think you would be as successful in putting them in order as you would if I read you five journal entries of yours that were from your spacetime experience.

I think that time as you mean it, in the sense of sequence, is imported from our interactions in public space into conceptual availability as memory. The actual 'substance' of time, as in a universal cosmological force is nothing but experience itself. It is more the ground from which sequence can emerge than a fully realized sequential nature of experience. It's more like dreamtime. Memories can appear out of nowhere. Timelines can be uncertain and irrelevant.


>
> Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

     Agreed.

>
> The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as > a topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those
> terms.

     The mistake of subtracting the observer from observations.

Exactly. The voyeur habit is the hardest to kick.


> In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes > closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part > of the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because
> you are the subject of the experience.

     Exactly!

> If anything, the outside world is a Platonic realm of geometric
> perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism is private
> time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, etc.
> Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm,
> realms come from thought.

Thoughts might be defined as the very act of n-th order categorization.

Yeah, I like that. The 'in the sense of' sense of sense. In one way it is the closest to pure sense, in another way it is the most aloof and unreal. The paradox of surfaces and depth.

Craig

--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html



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