Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 03 Sep 2012, at 15:11, benjayk wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> If you disagree, please tell me why.
>>> I don't disagree. I just point on the fact that you don't give any
>>> justification of your belief. If you are correct, there must be
>>> something in cells and brains that is not Turing emulable, and this  
>>> is
>>> speculative, as nobody has found anything not Turing emulable in  
>>> nature.
>> You say this often, Bruno, yet I have never seen an emulation of any  
>> living
>> system that functions the same as the original.
> This is not a valid argument. I have never seen a man walking on Mars,  
> but this does not make it impossible.
No, but we have no big gaps of belief to bridge if we consider a man walking
on Mars. It's not much different than the moon.
Yet emulating a natural system is something which we haven't even remotely
suceeded in. Yes, we simulated some systems, but they couldn't perform the
same function.
We also substituted some parts with non-living matter, but not with a mere

And then another, much bigger step is required in order to say
*everything*/everyone/every part can be emulated. It is like saying that we
can walk on all things, because we can walk on the moon. We most certainly
can't walk on the sun, though.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> With comp we cannot emulate a rock, so we can't certainly emulate a  
> living creature, as it is made of the apparent "matter", which needs  
> the complete UD*.
> But with comp all universal machine can emulate any universal machine,  
> so if I am a program, at some levcel of description, the activity of  
> that program, responsible for my consciousness here and now, can be  
> emulated exactly.
But why would you be a program? Why would you be more finite than a rock? I
can't follow your logic behind this.
Yes, assuming COMP your reasoning makes some sense, but then we are
confronted with the absurd situation of our local me's being computational,
yet everything we can actually observe being non-computational.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The default position is that it is not emulable.
> On the contrary. Having no evidence that there is something non Turing  
> emulable playing a role in the working mind,
We do have evidence. We can't even make sense of the notion of emulating
what is inherently indeterminate (like all matter, and so the brain as
well). How to emulate something which has no determinate state with machines
using (practically) determinate states?
We can emulate quantum computers, but they still work based on
definite/discrete states (though it allows for superposition of them, but
they are collapsed at the end of the computation).

Even according to COMP, it seems that matter is non-emulable. That this
doesn't play a role in the working of the brain is just an assumption (I
hope we agree there is a deep relation between local mind and brain). When
we actually look into the brain we can't find anything that says "whatever
is going on that is not emulable doesn't matter".

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  beyond its material constitution which by comp is only Turing recoverable
> in the limit  
> (and thus non emulable)
But that is the point. Why would its material constitution not matter? For
all we know it matters very much, as the behaviour of the matter in the
brain (and outside of it) determines its function.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  to bet that we are not machine is like  
> speculating on something quite bizarre, just to segregationate  
> negatively a class of entities.
I don't know what you arguing against. I have never "negatively
segregationated" any entity. It is just that computers can't do everything
humans can, just as adults can't do everything children can (or vice versa)
or plants can't do everything animals do (and vice versa) or life can't do
what lifeless matter does (and vice versa).
I have never postulated some moral hierarchy in there (though computers
don't seem to mind always doing what they are told to do, which we might
consider slavery, but that is just human bias).

Also, I don't speculate on us not being machines. We have no a priori reason
to assume we are machines in the first place, anymore than we have a reason
to assume we are plants.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> This is almost akin to saying that the Indians have no souls, as if  
> they would, they would know about Jesus, or to say that the Darwinian  
> theory is rather weak, as it fails to explain how God made the world  
> in six day.
I am not saying computers have no souls. Indeed, computers are just as much
awareness as everything else. There is ONLY soul. So I am not excluding or
segregating anyone or anything.
Computers are just intelligent in a different kind of way, just as indians
are different from germans in some ways (though obviously computers are far
more different to us).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> We have no a priori reason
>> to assume we can substitute one thing with another thing of an  
>> entirely
>> different class.
> Nature does that all the time.
Really? Show me a animal being substituted by a plant, or DNA being
substituted by another substance.
Nature does substitute things, but very seldomly fundamental things.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> We did it already consciously when we accept a pump in place of a  
> heart, or even when we just buy glasses.
Yes, OK, locally it is possible. But even than, a pump is not totally
equivalent to a heart, and glasses don't substitute eyes but enhance them.
I am all for enhancement of humans through computers. Obviously I am doing
that as well.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> We have no more reason to assume that we can substitute a
>> brain with an emulation of a brain than we have that we can  
>> substitute a
>> building with a drawing of a building
> LISP can pass the FORTRAN test. It can emulate precisely FORTRAN. The  
> very hypothesis of digitality is what makes possible the confusion of  
> level, at some precise level (and below).
> Nobody asks you to believe it works, but until we find a real evidence  
> against comp (like a different physics), it is a matter of personal  
> opinion.
First, the fact that matter is indeterminate is evidence against COMP
(computers are completely determinate).

Also, non-comp is the default hypothesis (since COMP makes very specific
claims about how things work and uses many assumptions), just like atheism
with regards to the invisible pink unicorn is the default hypothesis.
We can't find computations as fundamental entities, so it is a very big step
to postulate them. 

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> - even if it is so accurate that the
>> illusion of it being a building is perfect at first glance. You  
>> still can't
>> live in a drawing.
> The drawn people can live in a drawing. It sounds weird, because you  
> have gone used the statical "drawing" in place of the dynamical  
> "emulating".
> A virtual typhoon cannot make you wet, unless you have been  
> virtualized before. An emulated typhon can make wet emulated people,  
> with comp.
Sure, virtual people can live in virtual worlds and get wet there. I like to
play computer games and certainly some entities live in there, and things
happen to them. It's just that they just are virtual and can't replace the
"real" ones.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> There is no contradiction as we assume that the brain, even in the  
> generalized sense, is a universal emulator, so that *you* are already  
> emulated by a natural organic computer.
I agree that the brain is a universal emulator, I just don't think it is
ONLY a universal emulator.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> We approach the limits of science here, as we leave the realm of the
>> quantifiable and objectifiable, so frankly your statement just seems  
>> like
>> scientism to me.
> It would be if I was pretending to defend a truth, but I am just  
> humbly showing the consequence of a belief.
That's not how it appears to me. You seem to defend that it is speculation
that there are non-turing emulable processes in nature.
Yet we can readily observe the indeterminateness of nature, which can't be
emulated (because it has nothing to do with definite states or changes
thereof) and it is speculation that ANY natural process of sufficient
complexity can be simulated.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> From a mystical perspective (which can provide a useful fundament for
>> science), it can be quite self-evident that everything that exists is
>> infinite (even the finite is just a form of the infinite).
> Ha Ha !
> You gently set the trap.
> I can say this: if comp is true and if both you and me, and the  
> readers, are consistent, then you can understand, soon or later, why  
> if you are correct, you lost correctness when appealing to that  
> experience of the infinite.
> If not, *you* are the scientist speculating on a possibility which can  
> lead to a prohibition of a entheotechnology (artificial prosthesis  
> without any organ single out).
I am not for prohibition of a entheotechnology. Why not try artificial
brains if nothing else works?
I just don't think they will work very well, and I am sure that they
instantiate a very different aspect of consciousness, even if their
behaviour is similar (because they won't be strongly entangled with their
surroundings, like other brains, and because instantiation matters in a
bigger context).

I agree that in some sense I "lost correctness" when appealing to mysticism,
since it is not founded on logical consistency and is also not communicable.
So I'd rather appeal to your mystical experience.
I didn't say "I experienced it therefore it is true", but just that it
appears to be quite self-evident from that viewpoint.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> and thus can't be captured by any particular
>> description. So it is not emulable, because emulability rests on the  
>> premise
>> that what is emulated can be precisely captured (otherwise we have  
>> no way of
>> telling the computer what to do).
> Keep in mind that comp justifies precisely that matter, nor  
> consciousness is emulable.
> Comp makes only consciousness relatively emulable, with respect of  
> only probable computations.
> The first person actual moment is literally distributed on a complex  
> (very probably fractal) clouds of computational states.
I really don't see how it makes sense to say that matter and consciousness
are fundamentally not emulable, but they are completely emulable in all ways
that practically matter.
Where does that assumption come from?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Secondly entaglement. If all of existence is entangled and it is  
>> infinite in
>> scope then everything that exists has an aspect of infiniteness  
>> (because you
>> can't make sense of it apart from the rest of existence). Even tiny  
>> changes
>> in very small systems might me non-locally magnified to an abitrary  
>> degree
>> in other things/realms. This means that entanglement can't be truly
>> simulated, because every simulation would be incomplete (because the  
>> state
>> of the system depends on infinitely many other things, which we  
>> can't ALL
>> simulate) and thus critically wrong at the right level.
> Perfect description of the main feature of matter and consciousness in  
> the comp theory.
> With comp, if electrons still exist (in Z1*, say), we cannot emulate  
> them exactly as we would need to emulate in one instant, all the steps  
> of the UDs, so you are right indeed.
OK. Then it is just a very small step to conclude that we can't be emulated,
since our relative bodies are made of matter.
Sure we can simulate them relatively accurately (to the point of it being
unnoticeable in everyday relations), but given a sufficiently broad
viewpoint, the emulation will be wrong. As we get to the more transcendental
aspect of experience it will be seen that the emulation is not the real one
(though we could argue it allows the real one to manifest in some indirect

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> It might be possible to simulate the behaviour of the system  
>> outwardly, but
>> this would be only superficial since the system would be  
>> (relatively) cut
>> off from the transcendental realm that connects it to the rest of  
>> existence.
> OK. Comp assumes that nature made that cut off all the times, and we  
> even survive through it. Meaning also that the first person does not  
> really cut herself of. By Bp & p, linking the belief to truth, she  
> keep intact her ombilical chord to "God". Price: she lost her name and  
> naturally believe that comp is false.
Again, I don't have any reason to assume COMP. If you only want to talk with
that assumption in mind, we really won't get anywhere.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Nature and humans cut off all the times for the same reason that you  
> cut off yourself when buying a car, instead of a horse:  a car  
> emulates correctly the function of the horse you were needing, and it  
> looks like it is more economical.
OK, but then a car is just a substitution with regards to some function you
had in mind. A car is not the same aspect of consciousness as a horse, just
manifested in a different way. It is an altogether different aspect of
consciousness that performs a similar function in some contexts.
Digital brains might replace brains for some purposes (though I consider
that unlikely), but they still instantiate a very different aspect of

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The holism is not generated in nature, the holism is the reflect of a  
> deeper holism in the relations between the numbers, or any  
> hereditarily finite things.
I'd say the holism in the relations between the numbers is a reflection of
the deeper holism of the infinite awareness.


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