Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to 
Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get 
this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated 
assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given 
definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that 
Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory 
within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it 
anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since 
the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness 
actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. 
Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that 
implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are 
derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism 
would be reckless to say the least.

*Step one* talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with 
ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials 
or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal 
machine would be sufficient.

Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a 
trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to 
each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively 
result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as 
a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and 
speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied 
person come in?

Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role 
this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like 
teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is 
duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent 
a duplicate, not teleported the original.

I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:

*yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire 
thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain 
function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of 
non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is 
a universal commodity.

*Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, 
supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a 
theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from 
the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter 
or exit a computation?

*Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying 
independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. 
Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the 
beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic 
constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. 
Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward 
arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to