On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:## Advertising

*yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to your worldview.

`I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the computations in my`

`brain. It seems likely that I also require an outside environment/world with which I`

`interact in order to remain conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter`

`of the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even the whole galaxy must`

`be replaced by a digital representation in order to maintain your consciousness`

`unchanged. But this bothers me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed`

`universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has been replaced ALONG`

`WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion that everything is computable.`

*Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two questions simply are relevant.*Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that.AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural numbers.

`ISTM that Bruno rejects any reality behind the natural numbers (or other system of`

`computation). If often argues that the natural numbers exist, because they satisfy true`

`propositions: There exists a prime number between 1 and 3, therefore 2 exists. This`

`assumes a Platonist view of mathematical objects, which Peter D. Jones has argued against.`

Brent

In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive reality is sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality because it is more familiar to his correspondents.Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?Again, these two questions seem irrelevant.Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Pc173EEJR4IJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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