Hi Craig Weinberg 

Speaking of teleportation, if that means time travel, I find it strangely 
comforting that my parents
are actually, really alive back there in 1950. So in effect, you never
die, you just get time-shifted.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-05, 02:20:22
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One

On Tuesday, September 4, 2012 11:59:55 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
On 9/4/2012 9:48 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, 
just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, 
but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of 
comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, 
and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what 
he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I 
wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, 
this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual 
truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to 
physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own 
survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI 
simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough 
consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.

Hi Craig,

    Excellent post!

Thanks Stephen!

Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient 
organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or 
reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would 
be sufficient.
    Yep, the assumption is that the function that gives rise to Sense is 
exactly representable as countable and recursively enumerable functions. The 
trick is finding the machine configuration that matches each of these. That's 
where the engineers come in and the theorists go out the door.

That seems to be the hypocrisy of comp - it assumes that function is enough, 
that all-but-computation is epiphenomena, but then wants to bring it back home 
to the material universe to claim the prize. It makes me think of the self-help 
guru who preaches that money doesn't make you happy in a best-selling book.

Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion 
people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over 
cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported 
person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The 
writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where 
does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?

    The "person" rides the computation, it is not "located" any particular 
place. But all this is predicated on the condition that consciousness is, at 
its more rubimentary level, nothing but countable and recursively enumerable 
functions. THe real question that we need to ask is: Might there be a point 
where we no longer are dealing with countable and recursively enumerable 
functions? What about countable and recursively enumerable functions that are 
coding for other countable and recursively enumerable functions? Are those 
still "computable"? So far the answer seems to be: Yes, they are. But what 
about the "truth" of the statements that those countable and recursively 
enumerable functions encode? Are they countable and recursively enumerable 
functions? Nope! Those are something else entirely!

Right. Something about microelectronics and neurology though that blinds us to 
the chasm between the map and the territory. This kind of example with pencil 
and paper helps me see how really bizarre it is to expect a conscious 
experience to arise out of mechanism. I guess it's just Leibniz millhouse but 
really...say we have the code for the experience of the memory of the smell of 
pancakes. We have a trillion people furiously scribbling on notepads, talking 
to other scribblers on the phone, passing information, calculating stuff. We 
introduce this pancake code by calling 350,000 of them on the phone and issuing 
this code, and they all write it down, add it to the other numbers and 
addresses and whatnot, make thousands of phonecalls to other people who are 
also writing this stuff down and adding numbers with their special decoder 
rings, etc. So why and how does this pancake smell come into play?

If we assume that this is possible that the pancake smell is actually conjured 
in some way for some reason we can't imagine, then doesn't it open the doorway 
to disembodied spirits everywhere? We wouldn't need a whole Boltzmann brain to 
conjure a ghost or a demon, just some Boltzmann bits and seeds.

To me it only makes sense that we are our whole life, not just the brain cells 
or functions. The body is a public structural shadow of the private qualitative 
experience, which is an irreducible (but not incorruptible) gestalt.

Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this 
actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation 
and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an 
original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported 
the original.

    Notice that both the duplication and the teleportation, as discussed, 
assume that the information content is exactly copyable. This is not qubits 
that are involved... The point here is that this comp model assume that Reality 
is, at is ground level, classical. This is where my head starts spinning with 
Bruno's ideas....

haha, yes, well Bruno does warn about vertigo in the paper.

I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire 
thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function 
and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain 
devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal 

    Ummhummm, but it is! Why is that is so amazing?! Out notion of 
individuality is tied to the "autonomously moving and detecting and feeding and 
reproducing" machine that our minds inhabit! Why does its precise constitution 

In theory it shouldn't matter, but that's the problem, in reality it does 
matter and it matters a lot and in thousands of different ways. The 
constitution is exquisitely specific about how it handles arsenic, LSD, and 
Cheerios. Everything that feeds feeds on water and oxygen and glucose.

All that matters is that it can "exactly" carry our the necessary functions. 
Individual minds are just different "versions" of one and the same mind! To 
steal an idea from Deutsch, Other histories are just different universes are 
just different minds... The hard question is: How the hell do they get 
synchronized with each other?

I think they are synchronization itself to begin with. The question to me is, 
how do they get de-synchronized, and I think it's by introducing latency on a 
borrowed-as-space basis.
    We know that the synchronization cannot exist "ahead of time", simply 
because that is a massive contradiction! 

Why? If everything is a singular totality on one level, then synchronization is 
the precondition of time. Time is nothing but perspective-orchestrated 
What if the synchronization is just "accidental" (like Bruno proposes)? Well, 
not sure about how that would solve the problem! Why? Because the chances of an 
"accidental" synchronization of an arbitrarily long sequence of matchings 
between arbitrarily many minds (each defined in terms of infinitely many 
computations intersecting) is vanishingly small. It is exactly zero! "Huston, 
We Have A Problem!"

There could and would be multiple octaves and resonance artifacts due to the 
accidental re-synchronizations (which feed back on the original 
pre-synchronization at zero point). This is where living organisms come 
in...stuff that has fallen apart to such an extent that it begins to put itself 
back together on a higher octave...making opportunities for meta-feedback.

    Benjayk et al are posting about a related subject in the thread: RE: Two 
reasons why computers IMHO cannot exhibit intelligence It is all focused on the 
problem of the axiom of choice and constructability. I think the problem can be 
recast as a computational complexity problem, but I have been known to be not 
even wrong on occasion. My evidence is that the limitation that we see in the 
real world on computers is the scarcity of resources, which is why P does not 
equal NP IMHO. Without an eternally and exponentially expanding supply of 
resources (or tape), the UD simply cannot be run. Not even one step!
    Might this be just a form of an imperative on the existence of an endless 
supply of universes with exponentially expanding resources? Isn't this exactly 
what we observe in the star filled heavens? Maybe we finitely exist because we 
must, or else existence would contradict itself and vanish (like that Penguin 
in the Bloom County cartoon). Resources must exist for the computations to 
occur. We are God's thoughts.

Yeah, I don't know, any kind of universe-as-machine cosmology seems no better 
than a theological cosmology. What machine does the machine run on? What 
meta-arithmetic truths make arithmetic truths true?

Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, 
supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical 
theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is 
it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?

    It is an ontological theory that seeks to explain the appearance of 
"reality", thus it is meta-realism.

It doesn't find a purpose for realism though, so it seems like an unrealism to 

Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying 
independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like 
yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and 
saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal 
supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be 
self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic 
circuit? Where do errors come from?

    That's the right question to be asking!  Errors are sentences that are 
false in some code. Exactly how does this happen if one's beliefs are 
predicated on Bp & p(is true)?

Yeah, it seems to me like we should have to be spraying cybercide all over the 
place to prevent supercomputers from springing up in the vacuum flux or the 
sewer systems of large cities.





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