On 9/5/2012 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Sep 2012, at 14:01, Russell Standish wrote:
For certain choices of "this or that", the ultimate reality is
actually unknowable. For instance, the choice of a Turing complete
basis means that the hardware running the computations is completely
unknowable to the denizens of that computation.
Not really. With comp we know that the *physical* "bottom" is the
result of the competition among all universal machines, (by UD-7 or 8)
and this leads to (re)define physics by such a competition/measure on
all computations. The initial base ontology is really irrelevant, and
it makes no sense to choose one or another, except for technical
I am trying hard to be sure that I understand your ideas here.
Could you specify the cardinality of "all universal machines"? How many
of them possibly exist?
Put in another way: there is no ontological hardware. The hardware and
wetware are emergent on the digital basic ontology (which can be
described by numbers or combinators as they describe the same
computations and the same object: you can prove the existence of
combinators in arithmetic, and you can prove the existence of numbers
from the combinator S and K. So the basic ontology is really the same
and we can "know" it (betting on comp). It is really like the choice
of a base in a linear space.
So is there or is there not something that corresponds to
"resources" (such as memory) for the Universal machines in your thought?
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