On 07 Sep 2012, at 13:39, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/7/2012 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:But you claim that too, as matter is not primitive. or you lost meagain.I need matter to communicate with you, but that matter is explainedin comp as a a persistent relational entity, so I don't see theproblem. It is necessary in the sense that it is implied by thecomp hypothesis, even constructively (making comp testable). It iseven more stable and "solid" than anything we might extrapolatefrom observation, as we might be dreaming. Indeed it comes from theatemporal ultra-stable relations between numbers, that you recentlymention as not created by man (I am very glad :).BrunoDear Bruno,Matter is not primitive as it is not irreducible. My claim isthat matter is, explained very crudely, patterns of invariances forsome collection of inter-communicating observers (where an observercan be merely a photon detector that records its states).

OK, except that we have no photon at the start.

This is not contradictory to your explanation of it as "persistentrelational entity", but my definition is very explicit about therequirements that give rise to the "persistent relations". Ibelieve that these might be second order relations betweencomputational streams. and can be defined in terms of bisimulationrelations between streams.

You might try to relate this with the UDA consequences.

I question the very idea of "atemporal ultra-stable relationsbetween numbers" since numbers cannot be considered consistently asjust entities that correspond to 0, 1, 2, 3, ... We have to considerall possible denotations of the signified.

`I think this is deeply flawed. Notion of denotations and set of`

`denotations, are more complex that the notion of numbers.`

See http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem02.html#signifiedfor an explanation. Additionally, there are not just a single typeof number as there is a dependence on the model of arithmetic thatone is using.

`Outside arithmetic. This use the intuitive notion of numbers, even`

`second order arithmetic. This is explained, through comp, as construct`

`of numbers.`

For example Robinson Arithmetic and Peano Arithmetic do not definethe same numbers.

`Of course they do. RA has more model than PA, but we use the theory`

`with the intended model in mind, relying on our intuition of numbers,`

`not on any theory. No one ever interpret a number in the sense of a`

`non standard numbers. That would make comp quite fuzzy. Nobody would`

`say "yes" to a doctor if he believe that he is a non standard machine/`

`number. You can't code them in any finite (in the standard sense!) ways.`

So we have multiple signified and multiple signifiers and cannotassume a single mapping scheme between them. I suppose that acanonical map exists in terms of the Tennebaum theorem, but I needto discuss this more with you to resolve my understanding of thisquestion.

`You do at the absic level what I suspect you to do in many post.`

`Escaping forward in the complexity. But to get the technical results`

`all you need is assessing your intuition of finite, and things like`

`the sequence 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.`

`Then if you agree with the definition of addition and multiplication,`

`everything will be OK. If not you would be like a neuroscientist`

`trying to define a neuron by the activity of a brain thinking about a`

`neuron, and you will get a complexity catastrophe.`

`This remark is very important. Your critics here apply to all papers`

`you cite. We have to agree on simple things at the start,`

`independently of the fact that we can't define them by simpler notion.`

`For the numbers, or programs, finite strings, hereditarily finite`

`objects, the miracle is that we do share the standard notion of it,`

`unlike for any other notions like set, real number, etc.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.