Hi Craig Weinberg  

The Creator is not created. So no problem. 

And the supreme monad is able to do all of the
functions of a homunculus.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/11/2012  
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him  
so that everything could function." 
----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-11, 01:04:34 
Subject: Re: What must the perceiver be like? 




On Monday, September 10, 2012 7:00:22 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 
Hi Craig Weinberg  


I think that the perceiver must be a lot like the creator in 
terms of its not being an endless regress of homunculi. 
There has to be either a stopping point or an entrance to  
the nonphysical from the physical, the unextended 
from the extended. 

Sure, perception is by definition an anchoring of orientation. It recapitulates 
singularity. I don't know that I would call it a creator, more of an 
everythingness - a totality. The idea of homunculi is exactly why I don't think 
a creator is possible. To me, if the universe requires a creator, than 
certainly the creator would require a creator too. Why wouldn't it? 

There can't be a stopping point unless that point is the notion of stopping 
itself...which I think is the case. I call it the Sole Entropy Well conjecture. 
The first signal can only be the perpetual readiness for release from itself. 
All creation arises as nested juxtapositions of the presence and absence of 
that readiness.The Sole Entropy Well is a perpetually plummeting level of 
entropy relative to the fractally spawning subroutines within it, subroutines 
which are also experiences of readiness for release from themselves who 
preceive the outermost routine as that which is eternally 'stopped' (since it 
is, relative to their spawning and subdividing of the moment of singularity 
into eternities). 

Craig 
  


Platonia's  All is such an entity. 

Eh, Platonia is just a plug for incomplete understanding. If we can't make 
sense of the universe in terms of what we can access directly, then what's the 
point? Any explanation is as good as any other.  
  

Another might be the limit in terms of size of what a substance is. 
For you can't seem to get any smaller than Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, 
which would be a stopping point. 

Leibniz speaks in terms of reflectors. 

Elsewhere, perhaps in Leibniz, the perceiver is characterized as  
being a unity, a whole, a point of focus.  

I agree. I came to the same conclusion before I had heard of monads. 
  

It must 
also be very wideband, to take in much at one glance. 
And allow info coming in from many directrions and angles at once. 

You are assuming the universe as a nothingness within which signals are 
generated. To realize the monad, I think you have to turn it over and see 
signals emerging as reconnections of temporarily partitions of everythingess. 
  


Maxwell's Demon also seems to be at least part of a candidate. 
And I have guessed that intelligence itself must be the perceiver. 

Intelligence may be an overrated human subroutine. Sensation and perception are 
a lot more popular, and for good reason I think. 


Craig 
  


C'mon materialists, knock yourselves out ! 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/10/2012  
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him  
so that everything could function." 
----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-09, 13:27:09 
Subject: Re: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp 


Hi Roger, 

In my view, the "I" is how any particular subjective experience refers to 
itself. I agree, you can't have consciousness without the "I" orientation, 
although the ability to conceive of oneself may not be necessary for 
consciousness. Consciousness requires only an experience of being, not 
necessarily an understanding of the experience of being or self or "I". You 
could say that the term 'consciousness' refers specifically to self-awareness 
though, and I think it's ok to define the word that way. I'm more interested in 
the hard problem - so not human consciousness in particular but the faintest 
hint of awareness or sense as opposed to completely non-experiential 
unconsciousness. 

Craig 

On Saturday, September 8, 2012 10:56:51 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:  
Hi Craig Weinberg  

I seem to be a voice crying in the wilderness. So be it, but... 

When you say "Here I present ", how or where does the "I" fit into your 
philosophy ? 

You cannot have thinking or consciousness or intelligence or perception withut 
it. 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/8/2012  
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him  
so that everything could function." 
----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-08, 09:10:48 
Subject: Alice and Wittgenstein: Materialism, Functionalism, and Comp 


Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the relation between 
consciousness, information, and physicality by demonstrating the inadequacy of 
functionalist, computationalist, and materialist models and how they paint over 
the hard problem of consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy 
problem. 

I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: 
http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/
 

Consider "Alice in Wonderland" 

Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe herself in 
terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, words, and sentences of 
the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed of the bleached 
and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page parts of the whole book. 

The former I would say corresponds to the functionalist view of Alice as "roles 
and realizers", while the materialist view of Alice corresponds to the 
mereological "parts and wholes". To extend the metaphor to computationalism I 
would make the distinction between functionalism and computationalism as the 
difference between the string of English words being equivalent to the story of 
Alice (functionalism) and the same thing but with the capacity for the string 
of words to translate themselves into any language.  


Materialism = pages in a book,  
Functionalism = English words in sentences (literature),  
Computationalism / Digital Functionalism = Amazon Kindle that translates 
literature into any language (customized literature). 


Although this distinction between comp and functionalism does, I think, make 
comp superior to either functionalism or materialism, it is still ultimately 
the wrong approach as it takes the story and characters for granted as an 
unexplained precipitate of linguistic roles and grammatical realizers. This is 
Searle, etc. The symbol grounding problem. In this respect, comp and 
functionalism are equivalent - both wrong in the same way and in the way that 
is orthogonal/perpendicular to the way that materialism is the wrong approach. 

What must be understood about consciousness, and about Alice, is that nothing 
means anything without the possibility of perception and participation to begin 
with in the universe. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of 
perception or participation experiences emerging from either as that relies on 
a free lunch where either the paper and ink, the words and sentences, or the 
bits and bytes can spontaneously illustrate Alice and her world, as well as 
spontaneously invent the concept of illustration itself - of color and shape, 
of the lilt of her voice, the relation of those things to each other and how 
they are presented not as separate aspects being related but as a whole 
character. 
If we want to understand Alice as she is, not as she thinks of herself in terms 
of the pages, words, or bytes of her story, then I think we need to begin with 
the reality of Alice as 'the given'. We don? have to believe that she is 
anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, 
but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then 
the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages 
(cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and 
reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a 
publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public 
spatial sense to the private temporal sense.  

To extend this a bit more, we could say that the private motive to open the 
book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are 
what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, 
mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self. The story is not bytes 
or words or turning pages, it is intentionalized interior sensorimotive 
experience and nothing else. The map is not the territory.  
What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not 
personal or sub-personal at all, but rather they are different aspects of the 
impersonal: impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal 
(syntactic-operational). I propose a whole other indispensable half of this 
picture of consciousness and experience of which to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we 
cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen. 
We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. 
We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting 
ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience 
be human experience on it's native level, in it's native language, and nothing 
less. We are not merely aggregates of bytes and cells nor fragments of 
inevitable evolutionary algorithms of speciation, we are also irreducibly 
people with irreducibly human bodies. We propagate a conscious experience 
directly into our environment of our own (quasi-free) will, out of our own 
anthropological sense and motive. Of course the sub-personal and super-personal 
levels inform and influence our every choice and desire, but that doesn't 
negate the fact that there is a something personal to which these choices and 
desires actually refer. 

The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a 
protagonist - an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, 
etc? r does it? Does it literally ? ave a plot , or are stories more of an 
experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and 
expectations? These are the kinds of considerations we would have to make if we 
want to look at what consciousness actually is scientifically. Maybe it is 
better not to try to do that, or maybe it shouldn't be the concern of science. 
I am okay with that. But we should not be confused about what we are doing when 
we work with the vehicles and shadows of consciousness - the names and numbers, 
substances and functions. If we lose the realism of the self, then we will make 
books that publish their own empty stories, written by focus-group algorithms 
about the wonders of algorithms and emptiness and self-publishing books. 
Craig 

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