On Sunday, September 16, 2012 12:34:47 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> You may want to look at
> Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
> He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based on
> the materialist framework.
> p. 11 ï¿½For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves exist,
> and that theyï¿½re things or objects or ï¿½substancesï¿½ of some sort, and
> hence, given materialism, physical objects. One possibility is that
> there are in fact no better candidates for the title of ï¿½physical
> objectï¿½ than selves ï¿½ even if there are others that are as good.ï¿½
> p. 11 ï¿½This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously false,
> but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think through what
> it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or realistic
> materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think through what it
> is for something to be a thing or object.ï¿½
Thanks Evgenii. I have been meaning to check out Strawson for a while
actually. I agree that the self is physically and concretely real, but I
don't think it is an object. The self is the subject. I see and agree with
what Strawson is saying about the necessity of expanding our sense of what
is physical, and I understand why he thinks it makes sense to think of the
self as more of a 'thing' than anything - and I would agree, except that
'thing' is a term of objectification. I can only see myself as a thing in
theory. In fact, who I am has no thingness at all from my own perspective.
There is no object here, nothing which can be defined in terms of size,
weight, temperature, etc. A subject is made of qualities that have only
figurative dimensions, not literal body qualities.
> On 08.09.2012 15:10 Craig Weinberg said the following:
> > Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the
> > relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by
> > demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and
> > materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of
> > consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.
> > I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture:
> > Consider "Alice in Wonderland"
> > Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe
> > herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters,
> > words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether
> > she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that
> > are considered page parts of the whole book.
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