On Sunday, September 16, 2012 12:34:47 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
> Craig, 
>
> You may want to look at 
>
> Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics 
>
> He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based on 
> the materialist framework. 
>
> p. 11 �For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves exist, 
> and that they�re things or objects or �substances� of some sort, and 
> hence, given materialism, physical objects. One possibility is that 
> there are in fact no better candidates for the title of �physical 
> object� than selves � even if there are others that are as good.� 
>
> p. 11 �This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously false, 
> but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think through what 
> it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or realistic 
> materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think through what it 
> is for something to be a thing or object.� 
>
> Evgenii 
> -- 
>
> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/09/selves-an-essay-in-revisionary-metaphysics.html 
>
>
>
Thanks Evgenii. I have been meaning to check out Strawson for a while 
actually. I agree that the self is physically and concretely real, but I 
don't think it is an object. The self is the subject. I see and agree with 
what Strawson is saying about the necessity of expanding our sense of what 
is physical, and I understand why he thinks it makes sense to think of the 
self as more of a 'thing' than anything - and I would agree, except that 
'thing' is a term of objectification. I can only see myself as a thing in 
theory. In fact, who I am has no thingness at all from my own perspective. 
There is no object here, nothing which can be defined in terms of size, 
weight, temperature, etc. A subject is made of qualities that have only 
figurative dimensions, not literal body qualities.

Craig 


> On 08.09.2012 15:10 Craig Weinberg said the following: 
> > Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the 
> > relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by 
> > demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and 
> > materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of 
> > consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem. 
> > 
> > I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture: 
> > 
> http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2012/05/zoe-drayson-the-autonomy-of-the-mental-and-the-personalsubpersonal-distinction/
>  
> > 
> >  Consider "Alice in Wonderland" 
> > 
> > Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe 
> > herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters, 
> > words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether 
> > she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that 
> > are considered page parts of the whole book. 
> > 
>

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