On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:47:26 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 3:02:05 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Sep 2012, at 18:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, September 24, 2012 5:13:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Sep 2012, at 20:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>>
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On Sunday, September 23, 2012 11:28:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > On 23 Sep 2012, at 15:05, Roger Clough wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > > Hi Evgenii Rudnyi 
>>> > > 
>>> > > 
>>> > > Phenomena are the how physical processes appear to our senses. 
>>> > > So they are appearances, not the processes themselves. 
>>> > > But scientific experiments and measurements are not 
>>> > > made on the appearances, they are made on the 
>>> > > processes. Thus the appearences areor [phenomena 
>>> > > are said to be "well-grounded"  in the processes themselves. 
>>> > > 
>>> > > Kant spelled this out in great detail,  calling "noumena" the 
>>> > > actual physical process which we cannot reach by our senses, 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > And which does not exist, at least not in the sense that they cause 
>>> > our senses. 
>>> > This is the most counter-intuitive aspect of comp, as the physical 
>>> > process are projection on the conditions making the dream coherent. 
>>> > 
>>> > Why does comp want coherent dreams? 
>>>
>>> Coherent dreams are reasonable data. 
>>
>>
>> Why does comp want reasonable data?
>>
>>
>> Comp does not want them. We have them. They are what *we* want to 
>> explain. Comp is just the working hypothesis.
>>
>
> It's circular though. Why do we have them? 
>
>
> To be short, because we accept the arithmetical truth.
>

What is it that is doing the accepting, and what would arithmetical truth 
be without it?
 

>
>
> Comp is your working hypothesis, not mine :)
>
>
> This make coherent your belief in matter. But you are back at the start of 
> the mind body problem, as you assume everything we want to explain (mind, 
> body, and their relation).
>

I don't believe in matter so much as I believe in material appearances as a 
way to make sense of the impersonal. I assume that sense is the capacity to 
experience and to meta-juxtapose experiences within each other.  Out of 
this you get sub-personal (materialist), super-personal (idealist), and 
impersonal (functionalist) projections through which we can think that we 
could explain the absence of personal irreducibility.

If instead, we turn this inside out, and see personal level phenomenology 
as the primordial principle, then the other projections make perfect sense 
as organizational representations. The authentic presentation is local and 
proprietary, not disembodied and automatic.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig 
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> Comp has to justify their   
>>> existence (easy, with comp),  and their relative measure (hard). 
>>>
>>> Bruno 
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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