I thin that natural selection is tautological (is selected what has fitness, fitness is what is selected) but at the same time is not empty and it is scientifc because it can be falsified. At the same time, if it is agreed that is the direct mechanism that design the minds then this is the perfect condition for a foundation of eplistemology, and an absolute meaning of truth.
2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > > On 08 Oct 2012, at 23:39, Russell Standish wrote: > >> On Mon, Oct 08, 2012 at 01:13:35PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>> The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet >>> A response to David Deutsch’s recent article on AGI >>> October 8, 2012 by Ben Goertzel >>> >>> >> >> Thanks for posting this, Richard. I was thinking of writing my own >> detailed response to David Deutsch's op ed, but Ben Goertzel has done >> such a good job, I now don't have to! >> >> My response, similar to Ben's is that David does not convincingly >> explain why Popperian epistemology is the "secret sauce". In fact, it >> is not even at all obvious how to practically apply Popperian >> epistemology to the task at hand. Until some more detailed practical >> proposal is put forward, the best I can say is, meh, I'll believe it >> when it happens. > > > Strictly speaking, John Case has refuted Popperian epistemology(*), in the > sense that he showed that some Non Popperian machine can recognize larger > classes and more classes of phenomena than Popperian machine. Believing in > some non refutable theories can give an advantage with respect of some > classes of phenomena. > > > > > >> >> The problem that exercises me (when I get a chance to exercise it) is >> that of creativity. David Deutsch correctly identifies that this is one of >> the main impediments to AGI. Yet biological evolution is a creative >> process, one for which epistemology apparently has no role at all. > > > Not sure it is more creative than the UMs, the UD, the Mandelbrot set, or > arithmetic. > > > > >> >> Continuous, open-ended creativity in evolution is considered the main >> problem in Artificial Life (and perhaps other fields). Solving it may >> be the work of a single moment of inspiration (I wish), but more >> likely it will involve incremental advances in topics such as >> information, complexity, emergence and other such partly philosophical >> topics before we even understand what it means for something to be >> open-ended creative. > > > I agree. That's probably why people take time to understand that UMs and > arithmetic are already creative. > > > >> Popperian epistemology, to the extent it has a >> role, will come much further down the track. > > > Yes. With is good uses, and its misuses. Popper just made precise what > science is, except for its criteria of interesting and good theory. In fact > Popper theory was a real interesting theory, in the sense of Popper, as it > was refutable. But then people should not be so much astonished that it has > been refuted (of course in a theoretical context(*)). I can accept that > Popper analysis has a wide spectrum where it works well, but in the > foundations, it cannot be used a dogma. > > Bruno > > (*) CASE J. & NGO-MANGUELLE S., 1979, Refinements of inductive inference by > Popperian > machines. Tech. Rep., Dept. of Computer Science, State Univ. of New-York, > Buffalo. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.