My opinion for what that is worth is that arithmetical dreams
describe what happens in heaven where whatever we think
becomes reality and if enough of us think the same thing
it becomes a video game we can play together.

My opinion is that inanimate physical things are more concrete
even if consciousness is not.
Richard


On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 11:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 12 Oct 2012, at 16:30, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Wiki: "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental
> phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and
> body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about
> the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other
> positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2]"
>
> Bruno,
> It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism
> (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance)
> and now physicalism..
> What is left?
>
>
> Arithmetical dreams. Some can cohere enough to generate, from the machines'
> or numbers' point of view, persistant sharable video games.
>
> It is a form or mathematicalism, or arithmeticalism, with an unavoidable
> zest of "theologicalism" separating truth from proof.
>
> I am not sure that is true, but I give argument that it is testable. Also, I
> derive it from the assumption that there is a level where my body/brain is
> Turing emulable. So I don't propose a new theory: it is a proposition
> derived in a very old theory.
>
> If you are correct on the BEC, then comp will force to extract BEC from
> computer science and/or arithmetic. They have to win some measure battle on
> the set of all computations, to be short.
>
> Nothing disappears, but some things get a new epistemological status, as
> belonging to numbers dreams. It makes eventually physics more solid, as it
> become a necessary view of arithmetic as seen from inside.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> Hi Richard,
>
>
> On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
> Bruno,
>
>
> Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes
>
> electrons, protons, neutrons,
>
> neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So
>
> if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I
>
> bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string
>
> theory models.
>
>
>
> Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp
>
> first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The
>
> UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can
>
> be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations.
>
>
>
>
>
> It's like saying that god is everything, which is next
>
> to saying nothing.
>
>
>
> The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition
>
> and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it
>
> with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp
>
> refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature
>
> behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and
>
> why they have the current shape.
>
>
>
> (*)
>
> x + 0 = x
>
> x + s(y) = s(x + y)
>
>
> x *0 = 0
>
> x*s(y) = x*y + x
>
>
> An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms
>
>
> ((K, x), y) = x
>
> (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))
>
>
> A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators.
>
>
> All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the
>
> whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with
>
> quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make
>
> confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the
>
> quanta/qualia distinction.
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
>
> Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism,
>
>
>
> Richard: Please explain why not.
>
>
>
>
> It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain
>
>
> (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to*
>
>
> emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete
>
>
> infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology.
>
>
>
> So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers
>
>
> and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology).
>
>
> There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its
>
>
> greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view
>
>
> (except for "truth").
>
>
>
> It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on
>
>
> this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult.
>
>
> Or you can look at my paper:
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>
>
>
> Or other paper that you can find on my URL.
>
>
>
> But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as
>
>
> I am in a super-busy period.
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Craig,
>
>
>
>
> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the
>
>
>
> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if
>
>
>
> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then
>
>
>
> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.
>
>
>
> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.
>
>
>
>
> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory
>
>
>
> monads..
>
>
>
>
> For example take the binding problem where:
>
>
>
> "There  are  an  almost  infinite  number  of  possible, different
>
>
>
> objects we are capable of seeing,  There  cannot  be  a  single
>
>
>
> neuron,  often  referred  to  as  a  grandmother  cell,  for  each
>
>
>
> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)
>
>
>
> However, at a density of 10^90/cc
>
>
>
> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),
>
>
>
> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for
>
>
>
> "all different  values  of  depth,  motion,  color, and  spatial
>
>
>
> location"
>
>
>
> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:
>
>
>
>
> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>
>
>
>
> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things
>
>
>
> because of the BEC entanglement connection.
>
>
>
> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory
>
>
>
> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness
>
>
>
> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads
>
>
>
> perhaps to solve the binding problem
>
>
>
> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.
>
>
>
> Richard
>
>
>
>
>
>
> BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making
>
>
>
> the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look
>
>
>
> "very probable" in our neighborhood.
>
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>
>
>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger,
>
>
>
>
> To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error.
>
>
>
>
> More specifically,
>
>
>
> I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain
>
>
>
> and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement.
>
>
>
> BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate.
>
>
>
>
> It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different
>
>
>
> substances
>
>
>
> can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads
>
>
>
> are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space,
>
>
>
> crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is
>
>
>
> also a physical BEC in the brain.
>
>
>
>
> So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad
>
>
>
> BEC is substantive,
>
>
>
> are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the
>
>
>
> connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based
>
>
>
> on logic is a category error.
>
>
>
> Richard
>
>
>
>
>
> What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism
>
>
>
> though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things
>
>
>
> and nothing else does?
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>
>
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