Hi Roger, On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

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No!

The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

No!

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity.

`No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has`

`already shown this!`

Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directedcalculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directedplatonic reason,the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not knowenoughmathematics to be more specific.

`Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of Löb property. This is also`

`available from`

`http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/`

`"Löb's Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own`

`soundness without becoming inconsistent."`

`A slightly more technical discussion here:`

`http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry%27s_paradox>`

If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.

I will!

======================================================= A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergentproperty"of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name forPenrose's condition of non-computability ?http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html<http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html%20>"Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergentproperty of classicalcomputer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortextemporally bind information,and3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computationalcomplexity among neurons."

That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...

B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear oremerge through looking at a phenomenonat a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is anemergent property ofthe behavior of many minds.

`Sure, but the "integrity" or "wholeness" of an individual mind is`

`only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure`

`under consistent self-reference (which is what Löb's Theorem is all`

`about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the`

`symmetry somehow!`

IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiserposition.Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html<http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html%20>One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability,presumably that of Platonia as experienced.All art and insight comes from such an experience.

`No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on`

`Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it`

`straight from the Horse's mouth.`

http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: "In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect than the material world of our external experiences, but just as real."

`Exactly how the "contact" is made between the realms remains to be`

`explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP`

`program and I am desperately trying to find a solution.`

On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe thatthe universe is made up ofquantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the mostcomplex entities.He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculationsbelong to the realmof spin networks.

`The "physical universe" yes, he believes that... He has shown how`

`one can derive a crude version of space-time using spin combinatorials.`

This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility ofnon-computability,and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.

Not even wrong!

Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

No!

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond therange of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these haltedupward-directedcalculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directedplatonic reason,the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not knowenoughmathematics to be more specific. =================================================================

We must study the math, there are no short-cuts!

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:%20rclo...@verizon.net> 10/16/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen --

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