Hi Craig Weinberg 

By sense do you mean Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness?
Or all three as a process ?


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/17/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-16, 14:11:14 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 




On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:54:10 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:  
> Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could  
> have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.  
> Craig  
>  
Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is  
and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already  
have. But I missed it.  


This post http://s33light.org/post/24159233874 talks about why I use the word 
sense. I am saying that the only thing that the universe can be reduced to 
which is irreducible is sense, and by that I really mean sense in every sense, 
but in particular sensation, intuition, subjective feeling, pattern 
recognition, and categorization or discernment. 

Craig 
  

Richard  
>  
> On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:  
>>  
>> Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations  
>> ?  
>>  
>> The short answer is that I am proposing that :  
>>  
>> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position  
>> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.  
>>  
>> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make  
>> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the  
>> range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted  
>> upward-directed  
>> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic  
>> reason,  
>> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know  
>> enough  
>> mathematics to be more specific.  
>>  
>> If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> =======================================================  
>> A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:  
>> Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent  
>> property"  
>> of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:  
>>  
>> A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's  
>> condition of non-computability ?  
>>  
>> http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html  
>>  
>> "Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property  
>> of classical  
>> computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.  
>> The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that  
>>  
>> 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,  
>> 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex  
>> temporally bind information,  
>> and  
>> 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity  
>> among neurons."  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?  
>>  
>> Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or  
>> emerge through looking at a phenomenon  
>> at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an  
>> emergent property of  
>> the behavior of many minds.  
>>  
>> IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser  
>> position.  
>>  
>> Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:  
>>  
>> http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html  
>>  
>> One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably  
>> that of Platonia as experienced.  
>> All art and insight comes from such an experience.  
>>  
>> On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the  
>> universe is made up of  
>> quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex  
>> entities.  
>> He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong  
>> to the realm  
>> of spin networks.  
>>  
>> This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of  
>> non-computability,  
>> and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,  
>> to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.  
>>  
>> Instead, I propose the following:  
>>  
>> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position  
>> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.  
>>  
>> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make  
>> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the  
>> range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted  
>> upward-directed  
>> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic  
>> reason,  
>> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know  
>> enough  
>> mathematics to be more specific.  
>> =================================================================  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net  
>> 10/16/2012  
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  
>  
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