On 17 Oct 2012, at 20:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/17/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King
On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig
>> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of
sense. If you could
>> >have computation without sense, then there would be no
> Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense
> and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
> have. But I missed it.
Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.
Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p
aspect of anything.
This is equivalent with saying "I will not do science", and
coherent with your idea that 2+2=5.
How so? You are requiring that *any* intersection of 1p truths
to = a truthful 3p. This is wrong!
I was not saying that.
You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can
hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth,
and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity
of possible creatures.
Come on, Bruno, I am trying to "met you halfway" in your comp
I was talking to Craig.
Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth.
I am defending truth but must be consistent with the fact that
we can only *know* finite approximations of truth.
In science we don't defend truth. We develop belief from observation
and dialog, deduce new belief and test them until we change them. We
don't defend truth but try to agree on some and to derive from there.
I am not saying that defending truth can't be interesting, but it is
Some scientist and some philosophers can ignore the difference, and
that can be confusing, especially when we tackle on some hot point
where many acts as if they knew the truth.
The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private
qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as
quantitative public token views).
This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of
theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or
String theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.).
Sure, I agree but notice that your statement is of "theories".
We have to be able to falsify them with reference to multiple 1p
content for them to be possible 3p.
Comp makes arithmetic, as a TOE, falsifiable.
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