2012/10/19 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

>
> On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
> A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP
> the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different
> purpose. many of them are specific of each specie. Each of these modules is
> the result of the computation of certain areas of the brain. A functional
> module in the mind has´nt to be an area of the brain. Because the model of
> the mid in EP assumes comp, and assumes an specific, testable model for
> mind-brain design (natural selection) it is well suited for issues like
> this.
>
> Severe autists lack a module called "theory of 
> mind<https://www.google.es/search?hl=en&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=pastor+de+iglesia+translate&btnG=#hl=en&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=theory+of+mind+evolutionary+psychology&oq=theory+of+mind+evolutionary+psychology&gs_l=serp.3...271.1229.0.1475.8.6.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0.les%3Befrsh..0.0...1.1.EVKzs0KV4ko&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.&fp=e7c229ce7fe95b92&bpcl=35466521&biw=1241&bih=584>"
> . this module make you compute the mental states of other people. It gather
> information about their gestures, acts etc. It makes people interesting
> object to care about. Autists can learn rationally about the fact that
> other humans are like him, they can learn to take care of them. But they
> are not naturally interested in people. They dont care about if you have a
> mind, because they do not know what means a mind in another being. they
> just experience their own. For them, yuou are robot that they do not
> understand.
>
>
> That is possible, but I would say that "empathy", your module of a "theory
> of mind" is already present for all universal machine knowing that they are
> universal. Autist, in your theory, would be a L¨bian entity with some
> defect in that module, with respect to its local representation/body.
> Possible.
>
> But the theory of mind in the case of an universal machine conscious of
himself lack the  strong perception of another selves that humans have from
the visual clues of the gestures and reactions of others.  The human theory
of mind is not an abstract theory of mind, but a *human *theory of mind,
which evoques mirror feelings like worry, compassion, anger that we would
never have when contemplating a machine. It´s not a philosophical-rational
notion, but a instinctive one. And because this, it does not permits to
fall into solipsism. Unless a robot mimic an human, he can never trigger
this instinctive perception.

In the other side an autist may have the rational theory of mind of an
universal machine, but lack the strong perception of "there are others like
me around". This is a very important difference for practical matter but
also for theoretical ones, since the abstract, rational theory of mind is a
rationalization that builds itself from our instinctive perception of a
soul-mind in others.

>
>
>
> We ask ourselves about the existence of the mind in others because we have
> a innate capacity for perceiving and feeling the mind in other. However, a
> robot without human gestures, without human reactions would not excite our
> theory of mind module, and we would not have the intuitive perception of a
> mind in that cold thing.
>
> However this has nothing to do with the real thing.The theory of mind
> module evolved because it was very important for social life. But this is
> compatible with a reality in with each one of us live in an universe of
> zombies (some of them with postdoc in philosophy, church pastors etc) where
> we have the only soul. Of course I dont belive that. I have the "normal"
> belief. But this is one of the most deep and most widespread beliefs,
> because it is innate and you must fight against it to drop it out. This
> belief save you from a paralizing solipsism. That´s one of the reasons why
> I say "I believe, therefore I can act"
>
>
> I follow you well. I agree. Comp is the inverse of solipsim, as it
> attributes a soul to a larger class of entity than usually thought:
> machines, and even relative numbers in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 2012/10/17 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
>> believes about the p-zombie.
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>>
>> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
>> perception is a hypothetical being
>> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it
>> lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked
>> with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it
>> behaves
>> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the
>> stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
>>
>> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that
>> if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
>> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing
>> the first part of this sentence.
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 10/17/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
>> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
>> overlycomplexcomputations ?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>>
>> Hi Stephen P. King
>>
>> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
>> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
>> the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
>> say that intuiton does. But that just seems
>> to be a conjecture of his.
>>
>>
>> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 10/16/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> Hi Roger,
>>
>>     IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
>> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
>>
>>
>>
>> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
>> existence of p-zombie?
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
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>>
>
>
> --
> Alberto.
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-- 
Alberto.

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