Hi William R. Buckley  

Thank you for reminding me that materialists 
do believe that there is a mind identical to or
in some fashion related to the brain.  Since I
see no possibility that one substance (mind)
can act on another substance (brain), I
don't take their concept of mind seriously,
but I have remember that many (most) people
believe in the materialist view of mind. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/20/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: William R. Buckley  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-19, 08:42:36 
Subject: RE: RE: A test for solipsism 


> Hi William R. Buckley 
>  
> You can speak to a potential test subject, 
> but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. 

This is an assumption you make. 

> This is the Turing test, the results of which are not  
> certain. But it is the only test I can think of unless  
> you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc. 
>  
> If it does not reply, it's a zombie. 

Another assumption. In this case, you can talk to me and  
I will refuse to reply. That make me a zombie? 

> But just to be certain, 
> if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions 
> a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know, 
> such as 
>  
> 1) what color are your eyes ? 
> 2) What color are my eyes ? 
> 3) What is your mother's name ? 
> 4) How many fingers am I holding up ? 
> 5) What color is a plenget ? 
> 6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election? 
> 7) What is your birth date? 
> 8) Where were you born? 
> 9) How tall am I ? 
> 10) Am I taller than you are ? 
> 10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ? 

If one is able to fabricate (lie) with perfect recall (remembering  
all the lies), then one need not know anything in order to give you  
answer to all questions. 

Your thought process is muddled, Mr. Clough. 

wrb 

> etc. 
>  
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/19/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>  
>  
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: William R. Buckley 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39 
> Subject: RE: A test for solipsism 
>  
>  
> Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the 
> only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a 
> person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, 
> even if that conversation is with an illusion. 
>  
> For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger 
> Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a 
> figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference. 
>  
> Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief 
> I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe. 
>  
> wrb 
>  
>  
> > -----Original Message----- 
> > From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- 
> > l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough 
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM 
> > To: everything-list 
> > Subject: A test for solipsism 
> > 
> > Hi Bruno Marchal 
> > 
> > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig 
> > believes about the p-zombie. 
> > 
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie 
> > 
> > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and 
> > perception is a hypothetical being 
> > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it 
> > lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is 
> > poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain 
> > though it behaves 
> > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from 
> the 
> > stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." 
> > 
> > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say 
> that 
> > if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, 
> > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in 
> typing 
> > the first part of this sentence. 
> > 
> > 
> > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> > 10/17/2012 
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> > 
> > 
> > ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> > From: Bruno Marchal 
> > Receiver: everything-list 
> > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 
> > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of 
> > overlycomplexcomputations ? 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> > 
> > Hi Stephen P. King 
> > 
> > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that 
> > consciousness, arises at (or above ?) 
> > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to 
> > say that intuiton does. But that just seems 
> > to be a conjecture of his. 
> > 
> > 
> > ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 
> > 10/16/2012 
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> > 
> > 
> > Hi Roger, 
> > 
> > IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the 
> > content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the 
> > existence of p-zombie? 
> > 
> > 
> > Bruno 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> > 
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