Roger
Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in the senses.
So a machine does not need to have qualia to distinguish between phisical
effectds. It only need sensors that distinguish between them.

A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop a car.
With no problems.

http://www.gizmag.com/mercedes-benz-smart-stop-system/13122/


2012/10/20 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>

>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
> a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
> are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms
> what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
> is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
> is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
> also can recall past sensations of red to compare
> it with and give it a name "red", which a real
> person can identify as eg a red traffic light
> and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing
> the fact that red and green lights are in different
> positions).
> That would be a test of zombieness.
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/20/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51
> Subject: Re: A test for solipsism
>
> On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:
> > Hi Bruno Marchal
> >
> > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
> > believes about the p-zombie.
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> >
> > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> > perception is a hypothetical being
> > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that
> > it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a
> > zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel
> > any pain though it behaves
> > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
> > the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
> >
> > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
> > that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
> > typing the first part of this sentence.
> Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.
> But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,
> without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they
> might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is
> no solipsist.
> There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,
> almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p
> features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory
> which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,
> and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to
> some theory.
> Bruno
>
>
>
> >
> >
> > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> > 10/17/2012
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> >
> >
> > ----- Receiving the following content -----
> > From: Bruno Marchal
> > Receiver: everything-list
> > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> > overlycomplexcomputations ?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> >
> > Hi Stephen P. King
> >
> > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> > consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to
> > say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> > to be a conjecture of his.
> >
> >
> > ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
> > 10/16/2012
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> >
> >
> > Hi Roger,
> >
> > IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> > content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
> >
> >
> >
> > So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
> > existence of p-zombie?
> >
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
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