Hi Alberto G. Corona  

I have no problem with that, the problem I have
is that I believe that nonphysical things (things,
like Descartes' "mind", not extended in space)
like spirit, truly exist.  But to materialists,
that's nonsense, because being inextended it 
can't be measured and so doesn't exist.
And life is just a unique form of matter, 
so can be created.  And what is man but a 
bunch of atoms ?



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/20/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Alberto G. Corona  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-20, 08:48:39 
Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism 


Roger 
Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in the senses. So a 
machine does not need to have qualia to distinguish between phisical effectds. 
It only need sensors that distinguish between them. 


A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop a car. With 
no problems.? 


http://www.gizmag.com/mercedes-benz-smart-stop-system/13122/ 



2012/10/20 Roger Clough  

Hi Bruno Marchal  

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that  
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia 
are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms 
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red 
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red  
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind 
also can recall past sensations of red to compare 
it with and give it a name "red", which a real 
person can identify as eg a red traffic light 
and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing 
the fact that red and green lights are in different 
positions).  
That would be a test of zombieness. 
? 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
10/20/2012  

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  

Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51  
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism  

On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:  
> Hi Bruno Marchal  
>  
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig  
> believes about the p-zombie.  
>  
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie  
>  
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and  
> perception is a hypothetical being  
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that  
> it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a  
> zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel  
> any pain though it behaves  
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from  
> the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."  
>  
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say  
> that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,  
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in  
> typing the first part of this sentence.  
Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.  
But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,  
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they  
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is  
no solipsist.  
There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,  
almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p  
features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory  
which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,  
and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to  
some theory.  
Bruno  
? 
? 
? 
>  
>  
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
> 10/17/2012  
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  
>  
>  
> ----- Receiving the following content -----  
> From: Bruno Marchal  
> Receiver: everything-list  
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36  
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of  
> overlycomplexcomputations ?  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:  
>  
>  
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:  
>  
> Hi Stephen P. King  
>  
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that  
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)  
> the level of noncomputability. He just seems to  
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems  
> to be a conjecture of his.  
>  
>  
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net  
> 10/16/2012  
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  
>  
>  
> Hi Roger,  
>  
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the  
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...  
>  
>  
>  
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the  
> existence of p-zombie?  
>  
>  
> Bruno  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/  
>  
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>  
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/  
? 
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