On 19 Oct 2012, at 19:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/19/2012 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Life may support mathematics.
Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.
Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future
in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world
where natural computers are possible: in a world where the
phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp
creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical
reality what creates the computations in which we live.
So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some)
mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that
OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it
must do in a first person measure winning way on all computations
going through our state. That's nice as this explain that your
idea of evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the
I don´t think so .The difference between computation as an
ordinary process of matter from the idea of computation as the
ultimate essence of reality is that the first restrict not only
the mathematical laws, but also forces a matemacity of reality
because computation in living beings becomes a process with a
cost that favour a low kolmogorov complexity for the reality. In
essence, it forces a discoverable local universe... ,
In contrast, the idea of computation as the ultimate nature of
realtity postulates computations devoid of restrictions by
definition, so they may not restrict anything in the reality that
we perceive. we may be boltzmann brains, we may be a product not
of evolution but a product of random computations. we may perceive
And still much of your conclussions coming from the first person
indeterminacy may hold by considering living beings as ordinary
material personal computers.
Yes, that's step seven. If the universe is enough "big", to run a
*significant* part of the UD. But I think that the white rabbits
disappear only on the limit of the whole UD work (UD*).
Tell us more about how White Rabbits can appear if there is any
restriction of mutual logical consistency between 1p and in any
arbitrary recursion of 1p content?
We assume comp. If a digital computer processes the activity of your
brain in dream state with white rabbits, it means that such a
computation "with that dream" exist in infinitely many local
"incarnation" in the arithmetical (tiny, Turing universal) reality.
If you do a physical experience, the hallucination that all goes weird
at that moment exists also, in arithmetic. The measure problem
consists in justifying from consistency, self-reference, universal
numbers, their rarity, that is why apparent special universal (Turing)
laws prevails (and this keeping in mind the 1p, the 1p-indeterminacy,
the 3p relative distinctions, etc.)
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at