Yes, 
Hi Alberto G. Corona 

Yes, they are inconsistent. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/21/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Alberto G. Corona 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-10-20, 14:55:08 
Subject: Re: Measurability is not a condition of reality. 


Then the measure addict people believe in a lot of things that are not 
measurable: they believe in an external reality . 
They believe in a certain pitagoric cult to measurement, that is not 
measurable. They believe that their perception is transparent, 
and that his mind play no role, because it translates a complete objective and 
accurate view of reality. ?herefore the 
 mind and his relation with matter is not worth to study. They believe in 
things not measurable, 
like countries, specially their own (which they would laugh If i say that their 
country is ? bunch of atoms. 
Apparently their reductionism is selective).? 


They believe in their loved ones that are dead (they do not exist according 
with their point of view, but they 
sometimes talk with them, dedicate books to them and act like if they are 
observing them. They bet, trust and 
believe in persons, despite the fact that they are nor measurable.. They 
believe in their leaders. They believe in 
some scientist that are liars. but they believe them without making measures 
and experiments for themselves. 
It seems tha almost all that they believe derives from a sense of authority, 
like any other persom. 


And they do it well on believing in these nor measurable things, because if 
they doint believe, 
they would be paralized and will kill someone or kill themselves. 



2012/10/20 Roger Clough 

Hi Alberto G. Corona 

I have no problem with that, the problem I have 
is that I believe that nonphysical things (things, 
like Descartes' "mind", not extended in space) 
like spirit, truly exist. ?ut to materialists, 
that's nonsense, because being inextended it 
can't be measured and so doesn't exist. 
And life is just a unique form of matter, 
so can be created. ?nd what is man but a 
bunch of atoms ? 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/20/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Alberto G. Corona 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-10-20, 08:48:39 
Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism 


Roger 
Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in the senses. So a 
machine does not need to have qualia to distinguish between phisical effectds. 
It only need sensors that distinguish between them. 


A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop a car. With 
no problems.? 


http://www.gizmag.com/mercedes-benz-smart-stop-system/13122/ 



2012/10/20 Roger Clough 

Hi Bruno Marchal 

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that 
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia 
are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms 
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red 
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red 
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind 
also can recall past sensations of red to compare 
it with and give it a name "red", which a real 
person can identify as eg a red traffic light 
and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing 
the fact that red and green lights are in different 
positions). 
That would be a test of zombieness. 
? 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/20/2012 

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 

Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism 

On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig 
> believes about the p-zombie. 
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie 
> 
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and 
> perception is a hypothetical being 
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that 
> it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a 
> zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel 
> any pain though it behaves 
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from 
> the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." 
> 
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say 
> that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, 
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in 
> typing the first part of this sentence. 
Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. 
But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, 
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they 
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is 
no solipsist. 
There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition, 
almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p 
features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory 
which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable, 
and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to 
some theory. 
Bruno 
? 
? 
? 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/17/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of 
> overlycomplexcomputations ? 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that 
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?) 
> the level of noncomputability. He just seems to 
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems 
> to be a conjecture of his. 
> 
> 
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/16/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> Hi Roger, 
> 
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the 
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... 
> 
> 
> 
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the 
> existence of p-zombie? 
> 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
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> 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
? 
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