Hi Bruno Marchal
Numbers and calculations are not subjective,
for they are mindless.
Which means they can't experience anything.
They're dead in the water.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-10-22, 12:49:30
Subject: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists
On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:51, Roger Clough wrote:
On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal
> This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie
> definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind
> but it can still behave just as a real person would.
> But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind
> has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least
> to a realist.
> Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person
> does not need to have a mind. But that's in his
> definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic.
BRUNO: I agree with you on this.
Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong.
Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to
eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations
defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a
reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's
This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of
all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational
on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence
of consciousness and altered consciousness states.
ROGER: OK. As long as the computer stays 3p, then anything is possible.
You can't. Machines have 1p, personal memory, and personal relative incarnation
and relation with some truth.
1p = experiencing (only humans can do this).
Are you saying that dogs and cats have no 1p?
3p(1p) = a way of saying that a human can publicly describe his experience.
He cannot really do that, but he can communicate something, and then the
others, by using their own experience can, or cannot relate.
1p(3p) = a way of saying that a human can experience any description
or proposition (by himself, by a computer, by others)
3p = a description or proposition given by a human, or by a machine.
3p(3p) = computer "knowledge" of a proposition or description
I really don't know what it means to say that a computer knows something.
With comp you know perfectly well what it means, as comp is the hypothesis that
you are a computer. So a particular case of what "a computer knows something"
is what it means for you know something.
Ah! A computer can only know things by description, but not by
Forget the current man-made computer. We talk about a special sort of machine.
There is nothing in the brain that a computer cannot imitate, at some fine
grained level. So if you believe that brain can do something that acomputer can
do, you will have to give a 3p description of the brain which is not Turing
emulable. Then, first you are still stuck with a pre 3-things, so it will not
help you for the mind-body problem, and second, well, nobody find in Nature (as
opposed in math) non Turing emulable things in our neighborhood, except,
importantly, for the souls of machines and humans, and for their detailed
The soul of the machine, is not a machine, from the point of view of the
machine. Machine's naturally believe that their are not machine, especially
when growing ego.
Only humans can know things by either route.
Looks like a dogma. frankly, a very sad dogma. The Bp and Bp & p arithmetical
modalities already exemplifies why and how the machines (actually, not the
universal computer, but the L?ian believer) is sensible to the two routes.
Humans can be cute, and terrible, but for human and non human, it is always a
sort of error of declaring oneself superior, especially in feeling and
subjective matter. You don't know that.
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