On Thursday, October 25, 2012 6:08:43 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
> In order for a computer or comp to simulate an experience 
> it must be able to generate qualia.  That is the plural of 
>   qua锟�e/'kw锟�e/ 
> Noun: 
> A quality or property as perceived or experienced by a person. 
> So comp must not just simulate an event, it must 
> simulate  the qualia of an event.  The event as 
> experienced by a person. 
> According to Kant's model of perception, which is essentially 
> what happens to an event experienced by the mind, ie 
> the model of mind used by neuroscience, an event as perceived 
> is the input material or signals 
> a) synthesized by the mind 
> b) a unified version of that event as synthesized. 
> In order for comp to be successful, then, meaning to 
> simulate an experience, it must be able to be able 
> to convert an experience to a qualia of the experience. 
> This looks exceedingly difficult, since we do not know 
> how the mind synthesizes and unifies the raw 
> perception of an event.   
> The raw experience is Firstness 
> The synthezation and unification of that Firstness 
> is called 2nd-ness ansd 3rd-ness by Peirce. 

There is nothing to suggest that experience can be synthesized outside of 
experience. All experience is authentic and genuine within it's own context 
(a dream is really a dream, a delusion is really a delusion, etc). There is 
no possibility of something which does not have an experience to substitute 
a function or process which will satisfy the firstness of experience 
without being an experience. It is not, for example, like DC current which 
may be used to substitute for AC current in some situation. There is no 
substitute for or imitation of the capacity to experience.


> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:> 
> 10/25/2012   
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

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