On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
> >materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
> >reality)
> >
> >COMP   -> NOT MAT
> >
> >I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
> >MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
> >weirdness close to quantum Everett.
> But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There
> may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
> made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.  That's
> why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
> consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
> of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
> predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
> not reason to be associated with a particular body.

I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.

Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more restricted.



Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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