On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?
Is it just an anthropic selection argument?
I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness
2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."
But this is the step I questioned. Why not be like the Borg, i.e. one consciousness with
many bodies? I think we only 'expect' to find ourselves as we are because we don't have
good theory about how we might be otherwise. COMP proposes to explain how we are by the
UDA, but it needs to explain why we are associated with bodies - not just assume it to
3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)
4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint.
1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1)
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like
brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is
certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical though!).
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