On 11 Nov 2012, at 06:24, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 08:43:29PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."

But this is the step I questioned.  Why not be like the Borg, i.e.
one consciousness with many bodies?  I think we only 'expect' to

Quite possibly because Borgs have lower measure for the anthropic
selection to work on than single body minds, particularly with mortal
bodies, as I would assume a Borg mind is effectively immortal.

I have always felt that one resolution of the Doomsday Argument is
that humanity mind melds (or uploads, Singularity-style) so that
effectively no new minds get born.

I haven't quite figured out what happens if we invert the relationship
- many minds to a body. Why don't we all exhibit multiple personality
disorder? It probably has to do with the embodiment of the mind, but
still I don't know how this connects to the Anthropic Principle.

find ourselves as we are because we don't have good theory about how
we might be otherwise.  COMP proposes to explain how we are by the
UDA, but it needs to explain why we are associated with bodies - not
just assume it to avoid solipism.


Absolutely agree. In fact COMP exacerbates the situation, in that it
is a form of idealism, making the Anthropic Principle mysterious
rather than ordinary. Whilst this is definitely a strike in favour of
materialism, there are so many other disadvantages of materialism that
it is worth trying to nut out how COMP can support the Anthropic Principle.


It supports it in this sense. Soon or later the UD emulates the SWE of the Milky way, but with a different "Planck constant". We might fail to develop in such computations, or with more sparse and rare incarnation, hard to access in any immediate way from the type of normal computations we are living through, and that might justified the choice of some constant. But this we cannot know in advance, perhaps the Planck constant is itself determined by a law, that is by some key number/machine relations. The risk with the anthropic principle would be in overusing it, hidding some deeper necessary constrained. from inside there is no device capable of being sure that this or that is physical or just geographical. If the material hypostases would have collapsed, comp would have entailed that there are no physical laws, and that our laws are just a local (in arithmetic) geography. The Multiverse would have been a continuum of parametrized laws, with many different physics, but this is unlikely, both with comp and empiry, except for that 10^500 physical panorama of string theory, perhaps. Open problem in comp, to say the least.

Bruno




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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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