On 11/11/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Nov 2012, at 05:00, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.

But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?
Is it just an anthropic selection argument?


I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."

3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)

4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
consequently intersubjectivity.

Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint.

By praying, mainly. (grin).
It is not excluded that comp leads to solipsism, especially after or near death, but even after death, it is not guarantied either. Solipsism is avoided by the first person plural, when the entire population of universal beings is multiplied into coherent continuation. There might be anthropic, or consciousness-tropic conditions justifying this. I do think that the adding of "Dt" makes the job (and the "1p", redemolish it for the qualia and sensations).

Everett QM illustrate very well the 'contagion of duplications', making us sharing "normal histories". Empirically, Everett saves comp from solipsism, but to be "sure", assuming comp, we have to derive Everett QM from all computations (a concept that Church Thesis makes utterly mathematically clear, as you can choose any Turing universal system to be define it mathematically).

Dear Bruno,

Everett's MWI avoids solipsism by defining an observer in physical terms! Read his paper for yourself to see this.

1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1)
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like
brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is
certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical though!).

It may hard for him/her to become self-conscious, but there are evidence that ape embryo already dream that they climb in trees, so I think the new born baby is conscious.

To be conscious does not demand that the entity is conscious of its consciousness, IMHO.

But if you put it in a tank, his consciousness might quite similar to the disconnected consciousness of a Robinsonian arithmetic. This is not used in UDA.

Could you elaborate on the disconnected consciousness of a Robinsonian arithmetic a bit?

The salvia reports, but also the reports of people having been victim of some trauma might suggest this.

Salvia seems to work by suppressing memory, by making it so that the person under the influense only is aware of the present moment with no thoughts of previous moments of experience.



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