On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp
seems to only define a single conscious mind!
That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine
common to them.
Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a
plurality of minds.
It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with
different experiences and minds.
Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one first
If there is only one first person how is the content of such
completely self-consistent? My problem is that I don't understand how
all of the possible points of view implied by a plurality of minds can
be combined together into a single narrative of a self.
That might also be confused with solipsism.
If there is only one mind that exists then that mind is solipsistic
by definition; there are no other minds to consider. "... the self is
the only existing reality and that all other reality, including the
external world and other persons, are representations of that self, and
have no independent existence." It seems that minds cannot know of each
other directly at all.
Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It is the
case where not only you attribute consciousness to others, but you
attribute to them your own identity,
What does this mean: "you attribute to them your own identity?
where solipsism denies them consciousness and subjective identity (and
thus consider them as zombie).
Yes, in the case of strong solipsism, but solipsism is not a bad
thing if we are careful. One mind cannot know the content of some other
mind and thus minds 'do not exist' to each other (unless you use my
weird definition of existence).
To say that there is only person is very natural in the context of the
WM duplication experience, where from the 3-view,
I do not understand how the 3-view obtains in your thinking. Is
there an entity that has as its personal 1p the entire content of this
'3-view"? In my thinking the 3-view is an concept and is not real at all.
you are in both cities,
You are defining "you-ness" or "I-ness" in a strange way. I only
find myself in one location at any time. I join with John Clark in
complaining about this strange idea that you are promoting.
and then you differentiate, but you can still consider or understand
that the doppelganger is "you",
What maintains the identity? What is the invariant under the
transformations of location?
put in a different context, and then you can generalize and get the
idea that we are all the same original amoeba,
Ummm, you are thinking of consciousness as if it where a single
continuous 'fluid" that is distributed over all forms of life?
but put in a quite big set of variate experiences and sensations,
which deludes us about our identity and we fail to recognize ourselves
in the others.
This is the greatest failing of humanity in my opinion, the lack of
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