On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:

This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp seems to only define a single conscious mind!


That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M. Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God. You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine common to them.

Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a plurality of minds.

It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with different experiences and minds.

Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one first person.

If there is only one first person how is the content of such completely self-consistent? My problem is that I don't understand how all of the possible points of view implied by a plurality of minds can be combined together into a single narrative of a self.

 That might also be confused with solipsism.

If there is only one mind that exists then that mind is solipsistic by definition; there are no other minds to consider. "... the self is the only existing reality and that all other reality, including the external world and other persons, are representations of that self, and have no independent existence." It seems that minds cannot know of each other directly at all.

Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It is the case where not only you attribute consciousness to others, but you attribute to them your own identity,

    What does this mean: "you attribute to them your own identity?

where solipsism denies them consciousness and subjective identity (and thus consider them as zombie).

Yes, in the case of strong solipsism, but solipsism is not a bad thing if we are careful. One mind cannot know the content of some other mind and thus minds 'do not exist' to each other (unless you use my weird definition of existence).

To say that there is only person is very natural in the context of the WM duplication experience, where from the 3-view,

I do not understand how the 3-view obtains in your thinking. Is there an entity that has as its personal 1p the entire content of this '3-view"? In my thinking the 3-view is an concept and is not real at all.

you are in both cities,

You are defining "you-ness" or "I-ness" in a strange way. I only find myself in one location at any time. I join with John Clark in complaining about this strange idea that you are promoting.

and then you differentiate, but you can still consider or understand that the doppelganger is "you",

What maintains the identity? What is the invariant under the transformations of location?

put in a different context, and then you can generalize and get the idea that we are all the same original amoeba,

Ummm, you are thinking of consciousness as if it where a single continuous 'fluid" that is distributed over all forms of life?

but put in a quite big set of variate experiences and sensations, which deludes us about our identity and we fail to recognize ourselves in the others.

This is the greatest failing of humanity in my opinion, the lack of empathy.




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