On 12 Nov 2012, at 20:27, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/12/2012 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
COMP -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP
I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.
But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location
not reason to be associated with a particular body.
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from
COMP? Is it just an anthropic selection argument?
This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp
seems to only define a single conscious mind!
That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian
machine common to them.
I am trying to figure out how you differentiate "individual
persons" (which seem to be distinguished by their relative locations
- such as being in Moscow and being in Washington) from the abstract
Löbian machine common to them.
It is the same difference as the difference between a program applied
to some input, and the same program applied to another input. Here the
location might be virtual like in step six. A localization is a mean
to get an information. We could have used more abstract
differentiation with just two bits 0 or 1.
Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a
plurality of minds.
It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with
different experiences and minds.
What distiguishes the different machines?
Either their codes, or their inputs, or both.
My question follows from the way that Godel numbering makes the
natural ordering of the Integers vanish
That does not make sense.
unless there is a way to keep the native identity of the integers
separated from the Godel numbers and from the universal numbers.
? The identity of the numbers follows by the theory. Ax 0 ≠ s(x),
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y, etc. A Gödel number is just a program or machine
description written in arithmetic.
The Gödel numbering (programming) would not work, if it would change
the elementary arithmetical truth. Gödel numbers are built on the top
It seems to me that if we allow got Godel numbering schemes to
code propositions then we cause the uniqueness of number identity
to become degenerate. For example: 0123456789 can mean many
things. It can be a particular number, it can be a Godel code for
some other number, it can be a string of numbers...
A number support a person only relatively to a universal number.
You have the same problem with any notion of states description in
physics, or in any theory.
How are the universal numbers distinguished from each other at
the Platonic level?
Like 0 ≠ s(0).
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