On 13 Nov 2012, at 19:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/13/2012 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Nov 2012, at 00:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp
seems to only define a single conscious mind!
That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite
different conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian
machine common to them.
Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality
of numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto
a plurality of minds.
It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with
different experiences and minds.
Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one
If there is only one first person how is the content of such
There is only one person, in the sense of saying that if I
duplicate you in the WM way, you can consider that the person in W
and M are the same person (indeed you), but just put in different
No need to proceed if you disagree with this. It jusy makes sense:
it is consistent with comp, but the contrary too, so no need to
proceed on that identity question before understanding the whole
UDA, as you might be confused. It is really another topic.
We need to better understand where you define "personal identity"
such that this all follows.
I have already explain how UDA avoids the need of solving the personal
What defines your notion of "same"?
There are as many notion of same that there are hypostases.
My problem is that I don't understand how all of the possible
points of view implied by a plurality of minds can be combined
together into a single narrative of a self.
One the same person might have different experiences in this case.
What defines "sameness"?
At the ontological level, it is defined by the axiom of equality.
At the other level, by the hypostases modalities, and their
arithmetical content, or their higher level contents. But we don't
need that to get the "reversal".
Then, it an altogether different question to see if such lives can
be recombined. I think so, but again, this is not used in the
the reason I think so is that we can wake up and realize we were
doing two dreams at once. It is not different than remembering two
different hollidays, and not being able to remember which one occur
That might also be confused with solipsism.
If there is only one mind that exists then that mind is
solipsistic by definition;
Not with the usual definition of solipsism, which makes the others
there are no other minds to consider.
The other mind still exists, even if they belong to the experiences
of the same person. It is like with time travel. You go in the past
and talk with yourself. That is locally two different minds, even
if from a later pov, they can appear to belong to the same person.
Comp does not exclude *logically* that I might wake up and realize
that dreamed both your life and mine.
"... the self is the only existing reality and that all other
reality, including the external world and other persons, are
representations of that self, and have no independent existence."
It seems that minds cannot know of each other directly at all.
Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It
is the case where not only you attribute consciousness to others,
but you attribute to them your own identity,
What does this mean: "you attribute to them your own identity?
Imagine you look at a video. You see children playing soccer, and
then after 10 minutes, you realize that one of the kid there is
you. You recognize yourself in that kid. Well, it is the same here.
You recognize yourself in some other.
I do not understand your definition of "same-ness". My notion of
"same person" has to do with my memory of being in a succession of
locations and states in a narratable sequence where each new
experience is not inconsistent with the previous states and locations.
Don't mind this too much. I tend to think that there is only one 1p-
person, but this is advanced speculation. It is not used for the
reversal, and my opinion on this can still change a lot.
where solipsism denies them consciousness and subjective identity
(and thus consider them as zombie).
Yes, in the case of strong solipsism, but solipsism is not a bad
thing if we are careful.
Solipsism is or the type fact, from the 1p view, but becomes a
plausible dangerous falsity as a metaphysical assumption. It is an
elimination of all the others. A zombification, we could say.
It depends on how you define solipsism as a property and what has
I always use the most standard meaning of the technical terms.
One mind cannot know the content of some other mind and thus minds
'do not exist' to each other (unless you use my weird definition
Yes, that's the 1p fact.
To say that there is only person is very natural in the context
of the WM duplication experience, where from the 3-view,
I do not understand how the 3-view obtains in your thinking. Is
there an entity that has as its personal 1p the entire content of
this '3-view"? In my thinking the 3-view is an concept and is not
real at all.
Eventually there is no physical 3p, but without any 3p, then we are
back to the doctrinal ridiculous zombification of the other.
I know! I am trying to clarify this concept.
In comp we have arithmetic as a very good 3p base. Physics can be
used, like in UDA, but eventually physics is itself only 1p plural.
The 1p-plural can be very like a 3p, and can admit local 3p
descriptions, well, like in physics.
But the way that physics has tried to eliminate the observer is
now causing huge problems... One of my goals as a philosopher is to
find a generic notion of an observer that can be used in physics.
Keep in mind that with comp we can't postulate physics. (We can assume
that there is a physical reality but we must explain it: that's the
unavoidable (by the UDA) comp "body problem".
you are in both cities,
You are defining "you-ness" or "I-ness" in a strange way.
You must quote the whole paragraph. here the you was the 3p you
(the bodies, in that setting).
I only find myself in one location at any time.
Yes. That is the 1p view.
I join with John Clark in complaining about this strange idea that
you are promoting.
This contradicts all what you said for years. Gosh, you keep losing
me. You stop at step 3, now?
It seems so. I am confused on your definition of "same person".
This is not used in the UDA. You do an experience, and you have to
predict what experience you will lived, in the usual sense of you, as
you remain alive and singular in the duplication, as comp predicts.
John Clark makes only a confusion between first and third person views.
Now that I understand more of the AUDA's formal logic, it is making
my understanding of the UDA confused.
That's why I think it is better to be familiar with the UDA
consequences before studying AUDA.
Please consider that I am trying to clear up errors in my
understanding of comp.
and then you differentiate, but you can still consider or
understand that the doppelganger is "you",
What maintains the identity?
The memory of your past, the content of the diary (again in the UDA
protocols). It is stable by the comp hypothesis.
What acts as a memory in the arithmetic formalism of AUDA?
The usual notion of computer's memory. Computers are arithmetical
entity (relative universal numbers/numbers relations).
What is the invariant under the transformations of location?
Many things. Arithmetic, computer science, the laws of mind, the
laws of thought, physics, etc.
OK, what defines the set of variables over which the invariants
An invariant can be defined only given some continuous
transformation on some closed collection, no?
put in a different context, and then you can generalize and get
the idea that we are all the same original amoeba,
Ummm, you are thinking of consciousness as if it where a single
continuous 'fluid" that is distributed over all forms of life?
Then what is your intuition or concept of it? Is it continuous
over all universal machines?
Unclear question. Sorry. If you use "continuous" you should give me
which set you are alluding too, which transformations
but put in a quite big set of variate experiences and sensations,
which deludes us about our identity and we fail to recognize
ourselves in the others.
This is the greatest failing of humanity in my opinion, the lack
OK, but empathy is a weaker notion than what I was describing.
Empathy let you attribute consciousness and (human, animal)
identity to others, but this does not force you to put *your*
identity in others, which is a much stronger statement, mainly
asserted by mystics or logicians working in philosophy of mind or
cognitive science. It required some altered state of consciousness
to make sense, and is usually an handicap in the usual struggle of
life. Of course, such notion, when lived in some way, enhances the
usual empathy, but the contrapositive of it does not necessarily
Sure, I agree.
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