On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:25:51 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>  ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:> 
> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
> *Time:* 2012-11-18, 10:28:36
> *Subject:* Re: Leibniz's definition(s) of substance
>  CRAIG: Hi Roger,
> I think it's circular to define a monad as a being gifted with the power 
> of action if we are using the monad hypothesis to try to explain 
> consciousness, which can be considered the power of action in the sense 
> that L intends here. I don't think that in that sentence he is suggesting 
> that the mechanical automatons which were built in his lifetime would be 
> beings gifted with the power of action. Machines don't exactly have a 
> 'power' of action, but their operation results in the effect of the action 
> of their parts.
> ROGER: In Idealism no forces can be used, so action is always done "as 
> if".  Similar to representative government,
> where our representative, the Supreme Monad, acts by means of legislation 
> in terms of our wishes. This is all indirect,
> but the result appears "as if" we had acted directly. The issues you raise 
> below are in terms of mechanistic philosophy,
> and no doubt correct in those terms. But Leibniz's "as if" philosophy 
> achieves the same results in terms of ideas,
> not forces. That's apples, you're arguing oranges.  So it is impossible 
> for me to reply to your arguments,
> since they apply to the physical world, but Leibniz dealt with the 
> nonphysical world.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------t
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
What's the difference whether it is us directly or us as proxy who exerts 
the force of ideas on to physical matter? The hard problem works the same 
way in either case, and my model explains that relation better than 
idealism or materialism can.


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