Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, whatever they 
be. 


----- Have received the following content -----  
Sender: Roger Clough  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36 
Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads 


Hi Bruno Marchal  


1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the 
Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's 
1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God. 

2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I  
thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances.  

But natural numbers are different because 
even though they are only mental substances, they're still  
substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided. 
So they are of one part each. 

Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no  
physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that. 

That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p. 

WHOOPEE ! 

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/7/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46 
Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind 




On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote: 


Hi Bruno Marchal  

Indeed, we can not code for [1p].  But we need not abandon 
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive 
theory has done.  


On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the 
self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that 
physics emerge from the way the "numbers see themselves". 


But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness 
phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp & p definition. It is a 
bit technical. 


Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it 
plays the key role for consciousness and matter. 








  We can replace [1p] by its actions -  
those of perception,  in which terms are relational (subject: object).  
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. 


That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that 
we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p 
and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical 
relation at some level. 







That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or 
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. 
Your responses seem to leave out such relations.  I cannot find  
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument  
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive 
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize  
cognition.  While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work 
when living breathing humans are concerned. 


I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. 
You have computer science. 





IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent 
computer calculations from emulating the mind. 


The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of 
view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the comp 
hope, or the comp fear. 


Bruno 








[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12 
Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth 




On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote: 


On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:  
The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines 
knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from 
outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not codable.  The 1p 
truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not 
necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation). 


Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.  
Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable.  
Many things true about us is not codable either. 

Let me see if I understand that.  I think you are saying that p, i.e. that "p" 
describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a machine.  


No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2. 










That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit in 
its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part of the 
state corresponding to "I *believe* I am south of my landing point."  


Then Mars Rover is not L?ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is Turing 
universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality.  


But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic of a new 
'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each arithmetical 
proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it is 


Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2. 


We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need something like 
Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in general cannot defined in 
arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and study its logic, which obeys a soprt 
of temporal intuionistic logic (interpreting the S4Grz logic obtained). 










One could include such second-level states (which one might want to communicate 
to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another first-level state. 
Right? 



Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is in the "I 
believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to myself. The 1-I will be 
the non definable operator above. We connect the believer to the truth. It is 
easy to do for the sound correct machine.  


Bruno 









Brent 



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