Hi Russell Standish 

ditto.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/28/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Russell Standish 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-27, 17:44:49
Subject: Re: The Princeton EGG project


That would be an extraordinary result, if true. It would require us to
rewrite pretty much all of our physics textbooks.

Lets just say that I will remain sceptical until it has been
reproduced by multiple independent groups.

Cheers

On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 08:04:53AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> It seems hard to believe, but apparently computers placed
> around the globe can detect (by errors in their random generators) that 
> minds are globally focusing on big events , even sensing them
> before they happen: 
> 
> http://noosphere.princeton.edu/
> 
> 
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/27/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-12-27, 07:03:38
> Subject: Re: Computers and the solipsim issue
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 26 Dec 2012, at 22:19, Roger Clough wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Bruno,
> 
> The question of whether a thermostat or a computer is conscious
> or not seems to be the solipsism issue, namely that only the computer (not 
> us) 
> can know whether it is conscious or not. But if I cannot prove that
> other minds than mine do or do not exist, I suggest that simililarly,
> computer consciousness is impossible to prove (or disprove).
> 
> 
> That's correct. Nobody can prove that anything else can be conscious. This is 
> a theorem in the comp theory (accepting some definitions 'course).
> 
> 
> But this does not mean that consciousness is out of the scientific debate, 
> nor that we have no evidences that some others are conscious.
> 
> 
> Since recently I have evidence that all computer are conscious (even in a 
> highly disconnected or dissociative from our physical "reality").
> 
> 
> For the thermostat, I just don't know. It is unclear, because the term 
> thermostat is not well defined, and most definition does not make clear if we 
> can see a "person" there. But I prefer to be cautious. May be thermostat are 
> just NOT NOT conscious.
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/26/2012 
> "The one thing a woman looks for in a man is to be needed." - "Ethan Frome", 
> by Edith Wharton
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Roger Clough 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-12-26, 15:31:44
> Subject: Re: Re: How visual images are produced in the brain. Was 
> Dennettrightafter all ?
> 
> 
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> Reception requires consciousness, which a thermostat does not have.
> 
> 
> perception /per?ep?ion/ (per-sep'shun) the conscious mental registration of a 
> sensory stimulus.percep'tive 
> 
> per?ep?ion (pr-spshn) 
> n. 
> 1. The process, act, or faculty of perceiving.
> 2. Recognition and interpretation of sensory stimuli based chiefly on memory.
> 
> 
> perception 
> [p rsep'sh n] 
> Etymology: L, percipere, to perceive
> 1 the conscious recognition and interpretation of sensory stimuli that serve 
> as a basis for understanding, learning, and knowing or for motivating a 
> particular action or reaction. 
> 2 the result or product of the act of perceiving. Kinds of perception include 
> depth perception, extrasensory perception, facial perception, and 
> stereognostic perception. perceptive, perceptual, adj. 
> 
> 
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/26/2012 
> "The one thing a woman looks for in a man is to be needed." - "Ethan Frome", 
> by Edith Wharton
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-12-26, 06:41:02
> Subject: Re: How visual images are produced in the brain. Was 
> Dennettrightafter all ?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 26 Dec 2012, at 12:14, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 24 Dec 2012, at 17:24, Roger Clough wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi Telmo Menezes 
> 
> Consciousness does not emerge from anything.
> It is simply the act of perception.
> 
> 
> Roger, when I say "consciousness" what I mean is not the act of perception. A 
> thermostat can perceive the environment and act on it. Conversely, I can be 
> put in an isolation tank and still remain conscious.
> 
> 
> OK.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well with comp "my consciousness exists" is a 1) true proposition, 2) 
> unprovable, and 3) which supervenes on an infinity of arithmetical relations.
> 
> 
> So comp doesn't explain what consciousness is, but it tells us why that is 
> unknowable?
> 
> 
> Eventually this depends on what you mean by "explanation".
> 
> 
> Computationalism explains why consciousness is true and knowable, actually, 
> but not justifiable, once we can agree on some semi-axiom for consciousness: 
> like it is true for each of us, and invariant for the comp-digital-brain 
> substitution. It explains the universal feeling that we cannot convince any 
> other that we are conscious, and the logic of qualia (S4Grz1, X1*) should be 
> able to explain why consciousness is related to perception field, sensation, 
> etc. Then it explains how the matter illusion organize itself into a quantum 
> logic of observable, and this in a testable way.
> You can get more if you are willing to accept quasi definition of 
> consciousness, like consciousness = a believe in a reality, or a believe in 
> self-consistency, under the form of an unconscious betting procedure. Waking 
> up in the morning is about equivalent with betting that I will drink some 
> coffee soon, for example. I am betting that there is a reality in which I can 
> consistently achieve that goal. It is akin to Helmholtz theory of perception: 
> unconscious inductive inference.
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think it is not too much wrong to say that it emerges, at least in some 
> sense, from arithmetic.
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/24/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Telmo Menezes 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-12-22, 07:11:19
> Subject: Re: How visual images are produced in the brain. Was Dennett 
> rightafter all ?
> 
> 
> Hi Stephen,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2012 at 3:41 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> 
> wrote:
> 
> On 12/20/2012 6:17 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> 
> Hi Roger, 
> 
> 
> I accidentally sent the previous email before 
> I was done, sorry. Please consider this more complete version
> of the intended whole:
> Hi Telmo,
> Those images in the videoclips, while still remarkable, 
> probably were constructed simply by monitoring
> sensory MRI signals just as one might from a video camera, 
> and displaying them as a raster pattern, artificially 
> converting the time voltage signal into a timespace signal.
> 
> 
> Ok. We're not even sure what we're looking at. The brain is a gigantic^n 
> kludge. We are seeing stuff happening in the visual cortex that can be 
> meaningfully mapped to images. This stuff correlates with what the subject is 
> seeing, but in a weird way. 
> 
> 
> Hi Telmo,
> 
> ? As I was watching the brain scan image video I noticed a lot of weird text 
> like stuff mixed into the image. What was that? Artifacts?
> 
> 
> I think so. I believe they are caused by the new images being constructed 
> from samples of the original images shown to the subjects.
> 
> 
> 
> So we can speculate that we're watching, for example, a pattern matching 
> process taking place. The most spectacular thing for me is when we see 
> the?nticipation?f the ink blot explosion. That's something you wouldn't get 
> from a video camera (but you could get from a computer running a 
> sophisticated AI).
> Perception of the moving image from a given perspective
> by the brain might take place in the following way :
> 1)?IRSTNESS (The eye). The initial operation in processing the 
> raw optical signal is reception of the sensory signal.
> This is necessarily done by a monad (you or me), 
> because only monads see the world from a given 
> perspective.
> 
> 
> In my opinion you are conflating intelligence and consciousness. I see two 
> separate issues:
> 
> 
> 1) The human being as an agent senses things, assigns symbols to them, 
> compares them with his memories and so on. The brain tries to anticipate all 
> possible futures and then choses actions that are more likely to lead to a 
> future state that it prefers. This preference can be ultimately reduced to 
> pain avoidance / pleasure seeking. In my view, the fundamental pain and 
> pleasure signals have to be encoded some how in our DNA, and were selected to 
> optimise our chances of reproduction. All this is 3p and can be emulated by a 
> digital computer. Some of it already is.
> 
> 
> 2) There is a "me" here observing the universe from my perspective. I am me 
> and not you. There's a consciousness inside my body, attached to my mind (or 
> is it my mind)? I suspect there's one inside other people too, but I cannot 
> be sure. This is a 1p phenomena and outside the realm of science. It cannot 
> be explained by MRI machines and clever algorithms - although many 
> neuroscientists fail to realise it. This mystery is essentially what makes me 
> an agnostic more than an atheist. If there is a god, I suspect he's me (and 
> you). In a sense.
> 
> 
> You can have 1 without 2, the famous zombie.
> 
> 
> ? I disagree! The very act of fulfilling the requirements of 1 "connects it 
> to" the #2 version of itself. The isomorphism between 1 and 2 is just a fact 
> of how logical algebras can be represented as spaces (sets + relations) and 
> vice versa! What gets glossed over is that Human beings (and any other 
> physical system that has the potential to implement a universal machine) are 
> not static structures. The logical algebra that represents them cannot be 
> static either, it has to evolve as well. 
> ? Think of how you would model a neural network X as it learns new 
> patterns.... The propositions of your logical algebra for X would have to be 
> updated as the learning progresses, no?
> 
> 
> Ok, I agree that humans beings and neural networks are not static structures. 
> This is trivially true. I still don't get how consciousness is supposed to 
> emerge out of a dynamic process.
> 
> 
> Are you claiming, for example, that if I start running game of life it will 
> become conscious and have a 1p perspective? I'm not using this as a 
> counter-example, I am honestly asking. I don't know the answer to that.
> 
> 
> 
> This is not a visual display, only a
> complex sensory signal. 
> 2) SECONDNESS (the hippocampus ? the cerebellum? ). 
> The next stage is intelligent processing of the
> optical?ignal and into a useable?xpreswion of
> the visual image. 
> (From the monadology, we find that each monad 
> (you or me) does not ?erceive the world directly, 
> but is given such a perception by the supreme monad 
> (the One, or God). This supreme monad contains 
> the ability to intelligently construct the visual image
> from the optical nerve signal) 
> 3) THIRDNESS (cerebrum ?) Knowing this visual expresson
> by the individual monad according to its individual perspective. 
> This perspective is?omehow coordinated with motor muscles (left/right,
> etc.), but I question that this?s?n actual 2D or 3D "display,"
> such as in the videoclips. (The videoclips are another matter
> as they are artificialy constructed.)
> 
> 
> I agree with you, but maybe videoclips can still be created from there. If 
> the neural network contains a piece of information A, and this information 
> can be represented by image B, there has to be a function f: A -> B. Of 
> course finding this function (and/or computing it) might be incredibly hard.
> 
> 
> ? It is helpful to see function f: A -> B as a Functor and not a plain jane 
> function. Maybe a presheve is a better model.
> 
> 
> Fair enough for functor. I don't know what a presheve is.
> 
> 
> 
> If there is an actual or simulated display then we are
> faced with Dennett's problem: the infinite regress of 
> spectators, spectators of spectator, etc.
> 
> 
> Ok, but here we're back to 1p.
> 
> 
> ? We defeat Dennett by showing that the regress cannot occur when there are 
> physical resources required by the computations for each level of the 
> recursion. We can cutoff recursions in our algorithms with code: if count of 
> loops is 10, stop. But physical systems can not count, they just run out of 
> juice after a while....
> 
> 
> Yes. For example, in the simulation argument, you still end up having to have 
> an ultimate reality which is no longer a simulation.
> 
> 
> 
> But if there is no display, we do not need an observer self,
> and are possibly ending up with Michael Dennett's materialist 
> concept of the self. This might be called epi-phenominalism.
> The self is simply an expression of the brain.
> 
> 
> I don't believe it is just an expression of the brain (I suspect you don't 
> either), but part of the reason why I don't believe is 1p, so I cannot 
> communicate it (can I?). I don't know. I tried at dinner parties and got 
> funny looks.
> 
> 
> ? I do think that the consciousness is an expression of the brain *and* all 
> of its environment that molds its behavior. It is silly to think that skin is 
> the boundary that a mind associates with!
> 
> 
> Agreed.
> We cannot forget causal closure in our reasoning about 1p! 
> ? Telmo, can't you see that the defining characteristic of 1p is that one 
> cannot communicate it?
> 
> 
> I can.
> Only I can know exactly what it is like to be me. So I can infer or bet that 
> you have a "what it is like to be Telmo" but I cannot know it, by definition 
> and this relation is symmetrical between any pair of conscious entities.
> 
> 
> Ok, but why shouldn't I just believe in?olipsism?hen?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I do not at present know the answer.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ? Consider dual aspect monism! It works!
> 
> 
> What's the best place to read about it?
> 
> 
> -- 
> Onward!
> 
> Stephen
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> 

-- 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to