On 1/4/2013 1:54 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
On morphic telepathy
Note that Leibniz for good reasons (similar to Kant)
did not consider time and space to be substances,
so the monads all exist as a dust of points in an
inextended domain (to use Descartes' concepts)
which is by definition outside of spacetime
(is in mental domain). Space and time do not exist
ion the mental domain, so it is like a nonlocal field.
Is it necessary that monads are a "substance"? Could we think of
them as pure process the product of which is the content of experience
of the monad? Is this formulation antithetical to the definition that
Leibniz gives monads?
So had the monads windows, they would be in continual
direct instant communcation with each other, which L
disallows by not permitting them to have windows.
Or they could be in a continuous state of simulating the effects of
said communications on themselves an behaving 'as if' they where
observing each other. What the 'no windows' postulate provides is a
denial of 'exchange of substances' - which makes sense if there are no
substances at all anyway!
The supreme monad however can see everything
with perfect undistorted clarity from ts domain and
instantly updates the "perceptions" of each monad.
Why is this necessary? Why not have any one monad reflect in its
process all other monads? Every monad is in a sense 'the supreme monad'
in this way. No need for a hierarchical structure...
I use the "" since the actual perceptions are indirect
as described above.
It is "as if" they have continual direct communication
with each other. But they do not have perfect or equal
undistorted clarity of vision, so telepathy is individual and
can be sketchy.
Sure. QM allows for this kind of telepathy!
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