On 1/4/2013 1:54 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
On morphic telepathy

Note that Leibniz for good reasons (similar to Kant)
did not consider time and space to be substances,
so the monads all exist as a dust of points in an
inextended domain (to use Descartes' concepts)
which is by definition outside of spacetime
(is in mental domain). Space and time do not exist
ion the mental domain, so it is like a nonlocal field.

Dear Roger,

Is it necessary that monads are a "substance"? Could we think of them as pure process the product of which is the content of experience of the monad? Is this formulation antithetical to the definition that Leibniz gives monads?

So had the monads windows, they would be in continual
direct instant communcation with each other,  which L
disallows by not permitting them to have windows.

Or they could be in a continuous state of simulating the effects of said communications on themselves an behaving 'as if' they where observing each other. What the 'no windows' postulate provides is a denial of 'exchange of substances' - which makes sense if there are no substances at all anyway!

The supreme monad however can see everything
with perfect undistorted clarity from ts domain and
instantly updates the "perceptions" of each monad.

Why is this necessary? Why not have any one monad reflect in its process all other monads? Every monad is in a sense 'the supreme monad' in this way. No need for a hierarchical structure...

I use the "" since the actual perceptions are indirect
as described above.


It is "as if" they have continual direct  communication
with each other. But they do not have perfect or equal
undistorted clarity of vision, so telepathy is individual and
can be sketchy.

    Sure. QM allows for this kind of telepathy!



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to