On 1/4/2013 10:41 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
STEPHEN: Is it necessary that monads are a "substance"? Could we think of
them as pure process the product of which is the content of experience
of the monad? Is this formulation antithetical to the definition that
Leibniz gives monads?
ROGER: Keep in mind that Leibniz formulated his ideas in the 17th century,
when aside from Spinoza, there had been little new done since Aristotle.
I am trying to bring Leibniz' ideas in line with current
understanding of the universe. ;-)
Leibniz was trying to establish something fundamental to base his metaphysics
Yes, an alternative, even, to Descartes ideas. I see both of these
men as valiantly attacking the hardest problems in philosophy and partly
Something specific that you could essentially point to.
He had done away with two-substance
cartesian dualism by considering both mind and body from a mental or logical
Yes, but at a price. I am, you could say, trying to make the price
"reasonable". His PEH is, IMHO, too costly ontologically speaking. I am
seeking to replace it with a "ongoing computation" idea.
Of course the phenomenal world still existed, so he still needed some
way of mentally designating material objects.
Sure, and we can capture the "materialness" of physical reality
with appropriate concepts while not having to conjure utopian fantasies
of perfection. The way that computers can simulate each other perfectly
captures the interaction model what L proposed for interaction between
monads, but to use it we need a different way of thinking. IMHO, the
pseudo-telepathy of quantum games theory is perfect but still too
theoretical as it exists today.
These were all substances, but
L only considered as real or permanent only indivisible substances (substances
one part-- without internal boundaries.) These indivisible real objects he
My claim is that we can dispense completely with substances and use
relative invariances instead.
These have the same or at least very similar characteristics as morphic fields.
Time is not a feature in monadic space, which essentially rules out experiemnces
except as snapshots. Only the supreme monad can have experiences, IMHO.
The monads below only have fixed sets of perceptions, which are like
snapshots in an album of memories.
I agree but I argue that this is a feature of the PEH idea, which I
am trying to show to be flawed.
So had the monads windows, they would be in continual
direct instant communcation with each other, which L
disallows by not permitting them to have windows.
STEPHEN: Or they could be in a continuous state of simulating the effects of
said communications on themselves an behaving 'as if' they where
observing each other. What the 'no windows' postulate provides is a
denial of 'exchange of substances' - which makes sense if there are no
substances at all anyway!
ROGER: OK. Except the time continuity would only be "as if".
yes, but as if for each and every monad thus setting up a
'multisolipsistic' regime as Andrew Soltau discusses in his work.
Personally I believe that the denial of windows is deliberately
to disempower the monads so that only the omniscient supreme
monad is aware, as we ordinarily think of the term. In essence
the physical universe is simply the body of one great soul or person.
Yes, but to do so makes the role of free will degenerate. This is
too high a price, IMHO. It is like thehyper-Calvinist doctrine
(ROGER previously) > The supreme monad however can see everything
with perfect undistorted clarity from ts domain and
instantly updates the "perceptions" of each monad.
STEPHEN: Why is this necessary? Why not have any one monad reflect in its
process all other monads? Every monad is in a sense 'the supreme monad'
in this way. No need for a hierarchical structure...
ROGER: A single monad reflects all of the other monads, but only from his
perspective. Only the
Supreme Monad sees things as they really are (from all perspectives at once
(incomprehensible to us)
instead of the single perspective we call the phenomenol world).
My vision of L's idea was that all monads reflected all others. The
relation between them is that of a network, not a hierarchical tree. It
is interesting to note that if the network is large enough, there will
almost always be tree graphs definable in it as subsets. This leads to a
predominance of the appearance of a hierarchy for individual monads
within the network.
I use the "" since the actual perceptions are indirect
as described above.
ROGER: > It is "as if" they have continual direct communication
with each other. But they do not have perfect or equal
undistorted clarity of vision, so telepathy is individual and
can be sketchy.
Sure. QM allows for this kind of telepathy!
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