On 1/5/2013 7:46 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King


ROGER: He had done away with two-substance
cartesian dualism by considering both mind and body from a mental or logical aspect.

STEVE: Yes, but at a price. I am, you could say, trying to make the price "reasonable". His PEH is, IMHO, too costly ontologically speaking. I am seeking to replace it with a "ongoing computation" idea.

ROGER: Good idea. I had replaced it with thermodynamics, but that only works in the large.
    Right now I am exploring Sheldrake's concept of morphic resonances.

Hi Roger,

Cool. Thermodynamics should always drop out. I found that Penrose's new conformal cyclic cosmology idea adds even more.

>rse the phenomenal world still existed, so he still needed some appropriate
    >way of mentally designating material objects.

STEVE: Sure, and we can capture the "materialness" of physical reality with appropriate concepts while not having to conjure utopian fantasies of perfection. The way that computers can simulate each other perfectly captures the interaction model what L proposed for interaction between monads, but to use it we need a different way of thinking. IMHO, the pseudo-telepathy of quantum games theory is perfect but still too theoretical as it exists today. [Also,] QM allows for this kind of telepathy!
ROGER: Sounds like you have some great ideas.

    I have been studying this stuff for a long time...

(ROGER continuing to expound L's concept of substance) These were all substances, but L only considered as real or permanent only indivisible substances (substances of only one part-- without internal boundaries.) These indivisible real objects he called monads.

STEVE: My claim is that we can dispense completely with substances and use relative invariances instead.

ROGER: Cool. These (monads) have the same or at least very similar characteristics as morphic fields....

STEVE:  I agree.

ROGER: ....which I am continuing to explore, partly because they are supported by some empirical data.

....... I had previously said that time is not a feature in monadic space, which had essentially ruled out experiences
    except as snapshots.  That seems now to be too extreme.

STEVE: I agree [presumably with my previous ruling out of experiences] this is a feature of the PEH idea, which I am trying to show to be flawed.

yes, but as if for each and every monad thus setting up a 'multisolipsistic' regime as Andrew Soltau discusses in his work.

ROGER: Personally I believe that the denial of windows is deliberately
    to disempower the monads so that only the omniscient supreme
    monad is aware, as we ordinarily think of the term. In essence
    the physical universe is simply the body of one great soul or person.

    The closure of monads follows from the closure of perception.

STEVE: Yes, but to do so makes the role of free will degenerate. This is too high a price, IMHO. It is like the hyper-Calvinist doctrine. ROGER: God gave man free will to do good or evil, so determinism can't be a Christian doctrine. It would have been possible to know in advance what man would do (the PEH) , but knowing and causing are two different things. At the same time, they are difficult to understand, and easily confused, and moreover if you toss in the doctrine that man can do nothing good without God's help, and allow with the book of Job that God could allow evil to be done to man,
    the issue gets very very murky.
But I have no problem with the PEH, which God could do if He simply wanted to, a priori. Along with, and seemingly a necessity to, his creation of the world. So again I am sticking
    with Leibniz.
    (ROGER previously) > The supreme monad however can see everything
    with perfect undistorted clarity from ts domain and
    instantly updates the "perceptions" of each monad.
    I use the "" since the actual perceptions are indirect
as described above. A single monad reflects all of the other monads, but only from his perspective. Only the Supreme Monad sees things as they really are (from all perspectives at once (incomprehensible to us)
    instead of the single perspective we call the phenomenol world).

STEPHEN: Why is this necessary? Why not have any one monad reflect in its
process all other monads? Every monad is in a sense 'the supreme monad'
    in this way. No need for a hierarchical structure...
My vision of L's idea was that all monads reflected all others. The relation between them is that of a network, not a hierarchical tree. It is interesting to note that if the network is large enough, there will almost always be tree graphs definable in it as subsets. This leads to a predominance of the appearance of a hierarchy for individual monads within the network. ROGER: I think that the reaon is that since thoughts cannot act on another, neither can monads. Hence Leibniz's very complicated explanation of what happens when one ball strikes another. He has though these isssues out to some depth.

We can show, if we use the computation paradigm that Bruno is exploring, that we do not need a separate external world; we get it automatically by considering the synchronization of internal percepts of many monads.



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