On 1/8/2013 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Jan 2013, at 23:57, meekerdb wrote:
In Bruno's theory both mind and matter are products of computation. I think it will
turn out, as you say, that they are mutually necessary.
At *our level* I grant that they are both necessary.
But this does not mean they are necessarily necessary at all level.
Indeed, with computationalism (in cognitive science) both mind and matter are
necessarily NOT necessary at the fundamental level.
How could a universal Turing machine distinguish an emulation of its neighborhood
(including itself) by arithmetic, and that emulation done by a "concrete physical machine".
This does not make sense (and that's what the MGA is supposed to show, somehow).
When the physical is just a certain computation, then however that computation is realized
instantiates the physical. The UTM can't distinguish the emulation because the emulation
really is instantiating the physical (although it may also be necessary that mind be
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