2013/1/10 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

>
> On 09 Jan 2013, at 20:02, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2013/1/9 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>
>>
>> On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>  Hi,
>>>
>>> let us start with the proposed QS experiment by Tegmark,
>>>
>>
>> I publish this before. It made some physicists rather nervous against me,
>> so that I find worthy to vindicate it. I propose the comp suicide and
>> immortality even well before.
>> OK, this is only anecdote. But you can see that I made the "Tegmark
>> point"  in my 1991 "Mechanism and Personal Identity" paper, i.e. the point
>> that the witnesses are increasingly astonished, and not the experimenter,
>> who can actually easily predict that astonishment. I made that point to
>> illustrate the relativity of the points of view in the comp setting, and
>> the fact that the HP events (the first person white rabbits) although first
>> person impossible, are still possible and highly probable in the 3p view of
>> the first person of others. David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that
>> they could be zombie, but I am not sure this can work with comp. It is not
>> an important point, as we don't need this for the UDA.
>>
>>
>>
>>  a QS machine with a 99/100 chance of a *perfect* kill (so let's put
>>> aside HP failure or whatever so to have either the experimenter is killed
>>> with the given probabilities or it is not, no in between, so in 1/100 he is
>>> not killed and perfectly well, 99/100 he is killed).
>>>
>>> You are a witness of such experiment, and you're asked to make a bet on
>>> the experimenter surviving (or not).
>>>
>>> So you bet 100$, if you bet on the experimenter surviving, if he
>>> survive, you'll get 200$, if he does not you'll lose your bet, likewise if
>>> you bet on him die.
>>>
>>> What you should do contrary to what seems reasonable, is to bet on the
>>> experimenter will survive for the following reason:
>>>
>>> If MWI is true:
>>>
>>> 1st Test: in 99/100 worlds you lose 100$ (and the bet ends here, there
>>> is no experimenter left for a second round), in 1/100 worlds you win 200$
>>> 2nd Test: well... you cannot play again in the 99/100 worlds where you
>>> did lose 100$, so you start already with 200$ in your pocket for this 2nd
>>> test, so you should do the same, no here in 99/100 worlds, you did make a
>>> draw (you put 100$ in 1st test + 100$ win on the 1st test - 100$ you did
>>> lose now because the experimenter is dead), in 1/100 you win again 200$,
>>> that make 300$ in your pocket.
>>>
>>> From the 3rd test on, you can only get richer, weither the experimenter
>>> lives from your POV or not.
>>>
>>> In QM+collapse, if the guy luckily survive two tests, you win money...
>>> you'll only lose money if he is killed at the first test.
>>>
>>>
>>> So contrary to what you may think, you should bet the experimenter
>>> should live, because in MWI, it is garanteed that you'll win money in a lot
>>> branches after only two succeeded test, and as in QM+collapse, only the
>>> 99/100 of the first test lose money, all the others either make no loss or
>>> win money.
>>>
>>
>>
>> OK. But the probabilities for any amount of money that you can win
>> individually remains the same with MWI and collapse. MWI is just more "fair
>> ontologically", because all the possible winners exist, and indeed the
>> descendent of the two first win have got something, but they got it with
>> the same probability with the collapse, at each state of the procedure.
>> They just don't exist, in the "non lucky" collapse scenario.
>> You give only a reason to prefer more, or to fear more (if you think to
>> the bad rare events), the MWI than collapse.
>>
>> What would you say to someone telling you that he prefers collapse, as
>> with collapse, you have 1/100 to win some dollars, and 99/100 to lose, but
>> there will be only one winner possible and only one loser. And in the MWI,
>> there is always one winner and 99 losers! (times infinity!). So if the
>> question is in making more people happy and less people unhappy, may be
>> collapse is preferable at the start (with that kind of reasoning).
>>
>> For the witnesses, your bet is more "socially fair", but not in way
>> making possible for them to test MWI or ~MWI.
>>
>
> I still stand on "repeated improbable outcome" implies either MWI or QM
> false.
>
> If it's not the case then a 1/10⁶ probability outcome doesn't mean
> anything... if you notice 10⁹ validated outcome of a prior probability of
> 1/10⁶ I would say your prior probability calculus is wrong, if it's from
> your theory, I would say that your theory has been disprove. The point is
> in QM+collapse such outcome as 1/10⁶^10⁹ probability of occurence, it could
> not happen in our current universe lifetime *without* a *very good*
> explanation principle. Hence if that happened, I would say QM+collapse is
> falsified. *But* in MWI, such outcome **do** happen, probability calculus
> is not about happening but about distribution in MWI (contrary to
> QM+collapse) so it still stand.
>
> So if you see such event, you're left choosing between a new theory or
> MWI... QM+collapse *without* a very good explanation principle for such
> improbable occurence should be disproven... In MWI you have that good
> explanation principle, which is in MWI it *does* happen.
>
>
> OK. But for the witness it happens with the same probability than with the
> collapse. So this does not help the witness to decide.
> You seem to believe that if P is low, it can no more happen with the
> collapse theory,
>

No, I say it can no more happen in collapse theory without *a very good*
explanation principle. I'm sorry but if the theory predict it happens with
a 1/10⁹ probability of occurence and every time you test it, it happens...
I'd say your prior probability calculus is screwed, so without a *good*
explanation, your theory can be said to be falsified. As I said, the *good*
explanation with MWI is that *it does* happen.

Quentin


> but then MWI and ~MWI can be distinguished without QS, in some 3p way, and
> this is highly dubious.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Quentin
>
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>
>>
>>
>>
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