Stephen, 

Bruno endorsed at least part of my viewpoint below on whether
there can be multiple identities. I allowed multiple identities
(such as numbers) to exist in Platonia as long as they had different contexts.


----- Have received the following content -----  
Sender: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2013-01-16, 10:59:12 
Subject: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter 


On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:13, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> Specific properties, at least down here, are needed 
> if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot 
> exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same identity. 
> 
> I'm inclined to say that that is also true in Platonia, 
> which would be a disaster, for you could not say 1 = 1. 
> A saving grace might be that one of those 1's is before, 
> and the other, after the equal sign. That is, the numbers 
> are distinguished by context. 

I agree with all what you say here. Tell this to Stephen. 
Note that we are distinguished by context too. 

Bruno 


> 
> 
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
> 1/16/2013 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2013-01-15, 08:51:12 
> Subject: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter 
> 
> 
> On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:14, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
>> On 1/13/2013 2:02 PM, meekerdb wrote: 
>>> On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>> OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is 
>>>> necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that hypothesis 
>>>> testable. 
>>>> 
>>>> We have the logical entaiment: 
>>>> 
>>>> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> 
>>>> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness. 
>>>> 
>>>> It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from 
>>>> arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is itself 
>>>> the result of a self-selection events (the global first person 
>>>> indeterminacy). 
>>>> 
>>>> This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow. 
>>> 
>>> But you stop one step too soon. 
>>> 
>>> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> 
>>> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness -> 
>>> arithmetic. 
>>> 
>>> That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>> Hi, 
>> 
>> I agree with Brent but would refine the point to say that 'that 
>> there is something fundamental that has particular properties is 
>> unscientific dogma'. 
> 
> A dogma is only something that you cannot doubt or question. 
> 
> Now something fundamental without properties is just meaningless. In 
> my opinion. How could anything emerge from something without any 
> properties? 
> 
> You have not been able to explain this, up to now. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> --  
>> Onward! 
>> 
>> Stephen 
>> 
>> 
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> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
> 
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