Perhaps a simpler version of the argument against duplicates is that a substance is defined as a subject, possibly with a predicate or predicates. If two or more of these entities are the same, they are the same substance, which converts a duplicate into a single entity. Hence one , no longer two. Thus duplicates cannot be sustained.
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/17/2013 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-17, 07:16:49 Subject: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter On 16 Jan 2013, at 23:45, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 1/16/2013 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:13, Roger Clough wrote: >> >>> Hi Bruno Marchal >>> >>> Specific properties, at least down here, are needed >>> if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot >>> exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same >>> identity. >>> >>> I'm inclined to say that that is also true in Platonia, >>> which would be a disaster, for you could not say 1 = 1. >>> A saving grace might be that one of those 1's is before, >>> and the other, after the equal sign. That is, the numbers >>> are distinguished by context. >> >> I agree with all what you say here. Tell this to Stephen. >> Note that we are distinguished by context too. >> >> Bruno > Hi, > > There is no context or figure-ground relation at the primitive > level as such would be a distinction that makes no difference. To > who or what would such matter? Even consciousness cannot be > primitive, as it is distinct from non-consciousness.. Property > neutrality is a necessary condition for ontological primitivity. > > The principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (of Leibniz) is > exactly what I base my claim upon. In the absence of an agent to > affect distinctions or to have a bias of a point of view, all > properties vanish. That is solipsism, and you have to assume a basic consciousness, which is what I search an explanation for. Also, it contradicts comp. Also, without assumeing something Turing universal, you will not been able to have computers in your reality, so a theory which assumes not elementary properties to its basic object will be mud unable to explain where the consciousness of the distinction come from. > Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my proposal > that existence is necessary possiblity. Existence of what. "Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either. Which modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means the modal logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5 is the only one standard modal logic having no arithmetical interpretation. > When we consider the nature of ontological primitives and understand > that we are considering what must occur in the situation where there > is no special or preternatural agent to distinguish a 1 from a 2, > for example, then it follows that even the property of being a > number becomes degenerate. Then what you say make sense in a primitively physical universe, but you need to say "no" to the doctor to be coherent. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
