On 1/20/2013 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 1/18/2013 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing or 'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted away by the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me just ask you: Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of Nothing by Russell Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for the same basic idea, IMHO.

An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already many things to make sense.

Dear Bruno,

Baby steps. The concept that Russell Standish discusses in his book, that is denoted by the word "Nothing": Do you accept that this word points to a concept?

Yes. But there are as many "nothing" notion than "thing" notion. It makes sense only when we define the things we are talking about.

Dear Bruno,

There is one overarching concept in Russell Standish 's book that is denoted by the word Nothing:

"There is a mathematical equivalence between the
Everything, as represented by this collection of all
possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of
no information."

This "state of no information" is equivalent to my concept of the ontologically primitive: that which has no particular properties at all. Thus is not not a number nor matter nor any particular at all; it is the neutral ground. But this discussion is taking the assumption of a well founded or reductive ontology which I argue against except as a special case. Additionally, you consider a static and changeless ontology whereas I consider a process ontology, like that of Heraclitus, Bergson and A.N. whitehead.

You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times, but you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think, doesn't help.

You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he describes?

Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its reversal, but that can evolve.

I see the evolution as multileveled, flattening everything into a single level is causes only confusions.

Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my proposal that existence is necessary possiblity.

Existence of what.


That's the object of inquiry.

OK, so go to the next step. Is the existence of a mind precede the existence of what it might have as thoughts?


Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (---> physical realities).
Dear Bruno,

I see these as aspects of a cyclical relation of a process that generates physical realities. The relation is non-monotonic as well except of special cases such as what you consider.

Universal Machine Mind ==> Instances of physical realities
    |              ^
    |                 \
    |                     \
    |                         \
    V                            \
Number ---> Universal Machine

All of these aspects co-exist with each other and none is more ontologically primitive than the rest.

"Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either. Which modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means the modal logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5 is the only one standard modal logic having no arithmetical interpretation.

  Wrong level. How is S5 implicit in Leibniz? Could you explain this?

With Kripke:

<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in at least one world accessible from alpha. []p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in all the worlds accessible from alpha.

The alethic usual sense of "metaphysically possible" and "metaphysically necessary" can be be given by making all worlds accessible to each other, or more simply, by dropping the accessibility relation:

<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in at least one world. []p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in all the worlds.

In that case you can verify that, independently of the truth value of p, the following propositions are true in all worlds:

[](p->q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> p
[]p -> [][]p
<>p -> []<>p

(p -> []<>p can be derived). You get the system S5, and reciprocally S5 (that is the formula above + the necessitation rule (p/ []p), and classical propositional calculus) is complete for all formula true (whatever values taken by the propositional variable) in all worlds.

To sump up, in Leibniz or Aristotle all worlds are presumed to accessible from each others (which makes sense from a highly abstract metaphysical view). In Kripke, or in other semantics, worlds (states, whatever) get special relations with other worlds (accessibility, proximity, etc.).

Good, we agree on those concepts, but we need to get back to the impasse we have over the concept of Nothing (which I am equating to the neutral ontological primitive) and my argument against your claim that numbers can be ontological primitives.

I will let Russell agree or not with this. I have just no clue what you mean by the "neutral ontological primitive", as you oppose it to numbers, it cannot even make sense once we accept that our brain works like a machine.

Numbers have particular properties even as a category, they are different from colors, for example. Thus this disqualifies them to be ontologically fundamental.

Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery, you put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad press for your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same mistake as Goethe and Bergson, somehow.

    OK, but the same advice applies to you as well!



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