On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

> Hi Craig,
>     This video lecture series https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjABUhyu6dwdoes 
> a good job showing how a psychiatrist, Niall McLaren,  argues toward a 
> dual aspect theory. I recomend his books: 
> http://www.niallmclaren.com/bibliography

Nice. I watched the series and took some notes (and sent them off to him 

I like that he clearly sees the limitations of the other approaches, but he 
does not yet see the problems with 'information' and the 'semantic realm'. 
He is modeling experience in space rather than through time.  I would 
dispute that and say that nothing emerges from neuronal function except 
more neuronal function. Personal meaning is instead recovered as an 
experiential recapitulation of higher and lower levels (super-personal and 
sub-personal) of experience since experience is primitive and personal. His 
view mistakes the difference between one level of impersonal phenomena 
(form, matter) and another impersonal level (function, logic) for the 
difference between personal [presentations (representations)] and 
impersonal [representations (presentations)]*

He overlooks the same issue all the way down the line:

2. Logic gates, he says, "coopt the mechanical function to acquit the 
semantic function of defining relationships". I suggest pivoting that 
assumption. It is we, the human end user or programmer who coopts both the 
a-signifying mechanical forms and a-signifying semiotic functions of the 
logic gate for our personal agendas. The logic gate has no semantic agenda, 
it is, like a marionette or cartoon character, a mindless machine with two 
mindless aspects - a spatially extended form and a temporally inferred 
function. There is no temporally intended motive, except the one which has 
been co-opted by the third and primary influence - participatory awareness 

We are exploiting the public physics of the logic gate's form to generate a 
more subtle level of public physics which we read as signs. In other words, 
we exploit the public facing forms and functions of the gate to exploit our 
own public facing forms and functions (optical patterns to tease the eye, 
acoustic patterns to call to the ear), allowing a sharing and communication 
of experience *in spite of* forms and functions, which are completely 
hidden from the conscious spectacle. In fact no 'information' is exchanged, 
except metaphorically. What is exchanged is concretely real and physical, 
although physics and realism of course, should only be thought of as a 
range of scaled or scoped experience based on time-like frequencies on 
space-like obstructions.

3. He focuses on the logic of the mind rather than the richness of qualia. 
I suggest instead that the mind tries to be logical only when focusing on 
public interactions. Private fantasy would be the more raw presentation of 
mind; dreams, visions, delusions, etc. Logic is born out of necessity, not 
innate to consciousness. Left to our own devices, a brain in a 
nutritionally rich vat would wallow in a paradise of illogical raptures 

4. He conflates grammatical structure for meaning, missing the point that 
communication is a skill learned expressly for public interaction, not for 
private understanding. The true meaning itself is not assembled internally 
from parts using logic and grammar, but rather 'insists' as a narrative 
gestalt. 'The boy is eating some cake' is only an experience of verbal 
syntax through which we recover a deeper perceptual understanding of the 
referent, based on our experiences with or about boys, eating, and cake. 
The order of words is no longer important within the private range of 

While it is important to model thought backwards through communication like 
he does for purposes of AI development, it is a mistake to apply the model 
the ontology that way. The horse is not an assembly of carts, so to speak. 
The cart without the horse is useless. The words and sentences are empty 
carts without the personal experience of semiosis, which is not included in 
physics or information theory. Experience is the key.

5. His assumptions about personality and mental disorder are the weakest 
parts in my opinion. They are normative and nakedly behaviorist, mistaking 
again public behaviors for private realities. What he sees as simply a 
collection of habits, I see as a vast interiority of identity and influence 
rooted in the sub-personal, super-personal and super-signifying bands of 
sensory-motive experience.

6. I disagree too that neurons "pass information mindlessly".  I would say 
that the same could be said of our own mass production systems. All 
mechanism is mindless, but that doesn't mean that sub-personal organisms 
like neurons are devoid of intention or participatory experience. It is 
that sub-personal experience which our experience is made of; not the 
motions of structures within cells, but the private content associated with 
the public bodies which we define as cells (through our human scaled 

The three pronged plug that he says we are looking for is sensory-motive 
participation (or 'sense'). The three prongs are (I) private experience, 
(II) public bodies, and (III) the potential for significance-entropy to be 
generated through the multiple levels of 
spacetime-body::timespace-experience interaction.

I was sure to mention that I do appreciate his work. I think that he is 
doing a great job, and I probably disagree with his views less than I do 

*[fundamental or absolute reality(derived or empirical reality)]

1. He says that meaning "emerges from neuronal function". 

> Onward!
> Stephen

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