On 27 Jan 2013, at 07:09, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/26/2013 9:53 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I think what you are describing comes automatically with comp, as any observer only knows their direct observations, which could be created by any one of an infinite number of possible programs going through the same state. Any one of these programs will have its own consistent history, but unless analyzed or explored further, that information is in a sense, undecided. It is like: "Before you finish reading the second half of this sentence, the color of your toothbrush could have been any possible color." However, now that you have finished reading it, and performed a memory look up you have changed the set of possible programs manifest your consciousness. It is almost scary to think, when you aren't looking or or imagining/recalling what your mother, your wife, your children, they could look like or be almost anything (within some constraints of what is compatible with your experience in the moment you are not thinking of them). And it is only when we "stop and think" we can for a time, lock down that possibility.

'You' are only a consistent history of experiences too, and so 'you' could be almost anything also. But this fails to explain the intersubjective agreement of observers: That you AND your wife agree on what your children look like. So unless you are a solipist, just dreaming your wife's agreement, an external reality becomes a good hypothesis.

Good point. With comp the external reality is arithmetic or something Turing equivalent.

Bruno




Brent

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