On 29 Jan 2013, at 15:04, Richard Ruquist wrote:

A block universe does not allow for consciousness.

With comp consciousness does not allow any (aristotelian) universes.

There is comp block mindscape, and the universe(s) = the border of the mindscape as seen from inside.



The fact the we all possess consciousness, so we think,
means that our universe is not completely blocked,

From inside.





although the deviations from "block" may be minor
and inconsequential regarding the Omega Point.

The comp mind-body problems can be restated by the fact that with comp, there is an infinity of omega points, and the physics of here and now should be retrieved from some sum or integral on all omega points.

By using the self-reference logics we got all the nuances we need (3p, 1p, 1p-plural, communicable, sharable, observable, etc.).

Bruno





Richard.

On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 11:18 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Here's an essay that is suggestive of Bruno's distinction between what is provable and what is true (knowable) but unprovable. Maybe this is a place
where COMP could contribute to the understanding of QM.

Brent




Lessons from the Block Universe


Ken Wharton
Department of Physics and Astronomy
San José State University



http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Wharton_Wharton_Essay.pdf?phpMyAdmin=0c371ccdae9b5ff3071bae814fb4f9e9


In Liouville mechanics, states of incomplete
knowledge exhibit phenomena analogous to those exhibited
by pure quantum states. Among these are the existence
of a no-cloning theorem for such states [21, 23],
the impossibility of discriminating such states with certainty
[21, 24], the lack of exponential divergence of such
states (in the space of epistemic states) under chaotic
evolution [25], and, for correlated states, many of the
features of entanglement [26]. On the other hand, states
of complete knowledge do not exhibit these phenomena.
This suggests that one would obtain a better analogy
with quantum theory if states of complete knowledge
were somehow impossible to achieve, that is, if somehow
maximal knowledge was always incomplete knowledge
[21, 22, 27]. This idea is borne out by the results
of this paper. In fact, the toy theory suggests that the
restriction on knowledge should take a particular form,
namely, that one’s knowledge be quantitatively equal to
one’s ignorance in a state of maximal knowledge.

It is important to bear in mind that one cannot derive
quantum theory from the toy theory, nor from any
simple modification thereof. The problem is that the
toy theory is a theory of incomplete knowledge about
local and noncontextual hidden variables, and it is well
known that quantum theory cannot be understood in this
way [28, 30, 31]. This prompts the obvious question: if
a quantum state is a state of knowledge, and it is not
knowledge of local and noncontextual hidden variables,
then what is it knowledge about? We do not at present
have a good answer to this question.


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