I do think that a block universe can contain minds in a certain way. The
objections against that are based in the absence of time, but space(3D
geometry) and time can and should be a product of the machinery of the
mind, in the kantian sense. But while in Kant things in themselves are
unreachable, in the block universe the thing in themselves are pure
mathematics. so there are infinite minds at different moments that produce
psychological phenomenons in coherence with the infinite sucession of
brains along their lines of life, that are perceived psychologicaly as
time. these brains and living beings, are localy perceived as products of
natural selection, but seen from above, their lines of life are just
trajectories where, by fortunate collisions of particles, chemical and
electrical signals, the entropy is exceptionally maintained constant (until
the end of the line of life)

But the minds are somehow in another world, the world of the mind, which
includes not only our thoughs but everithing we see around us, because
everithing the mind see is produced by the machinery of the brain. Then the
block universe of mathematics brings only the coherent substrate where the
world of the mind can appear by evolution. Because it is a world with laws
and rules, given by the mathematical nature behind, it is not a collection
of boltzmann brains, or, if it is, they are a extraordinary persistent and
coherent form of it so that it appear to contain laws of nature and shared
experiences, because we can ask ourselves and communicate and agree, on
these laws and these experiences.




2013/1/31 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>

>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> The block universe is the physical universe. So we are not part of it,
> for it does not allow subjectivity, which is nonphysical. Or
> mathematics or comp, which are also nonphysical.
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2013-01-30, 12:45:53
> *Subject:* Re: Lessons from the Block Universe
>
>   On 29 Jan 2013, at 15:04, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> > A block universe does not allow for consciousness.
>
> With comp consciousness does not allow any (aristotelian) universes.
>
> There is comp block mindscape, and the universe(s) = the border of the
> mindscape as seen from inside.
>
>
>
> > The fact the we all possess consciousness, so we think,
> > means that our universe is not completely blocked,
>
>  From inside.
>
>
>
>
>
> > although the deviations from "block" may be minor
> > and inconsequential regarding the Omega Point.
>
> The comp mind-body problems can be restated by the fact that with
> comp, there is an infinity of omega points, and the physics of here
> and now should be retrieved from some sum or integral on all omega
> points.
>
> By using the self-reference logics we got all the nuances we need (3p,
> 1p, 1p-plural, communicable, sharable, observable, etc.).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> > Richard.
> >
> > On Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 11:18 PM, meekerdb 
> > <meeke...@verizon.net<+meeke...@verizon.net>>
>
> > wrote:
> >> Here's an essay that is suggestive of Bruno's distinction between
> >> what is
> >> provable and what is true (knowable) but unprovable. Maybe this is
> >> a place
> >> where COMP could contribute to the understanding of QM.
> >>
> >> Brent
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Lessons from the Block Universe
> >>
> >>
> >> Ken Wharton
> >> Department of Physics and Astronomy
> >> San Jos� State University
>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Wharton_Wharton_Essay.pdf?phpMyAdmin=0c371ccdae9b5ff3071bae814fb4f9e9
> >>
> >>
> >> In Liouville mechanics, states of incomplete
> >> knowledge exhibit phenomena analogous to those exhibited
> >> by pure quantum states. Among these are the existence
> >> of a no-cloning theorem for such states [21, 23],
> >> the impossibility of discriminating such states with certainty
> >> [21, 24], the lack of exponential divergence of such
> >> states (in the space of epistemic states) under chaotic
> >> evolution [25], and, for correlated states, many of the
> >> features of entanglement [26]. On the other hand, states
> >> of complete knowledge do not exhibit these phenomena.
> >> This suggests that one would obtain a better analogy
> >> with quantum theory if states of complete knowledge
> >> were somehow impossible to achieve, that is, if somehow
> >> maximal knowledge was always incomplete knowledge
> >> [21, 22, 27]. This idea is borne out by the results
> >> of this paper. In fact, the toy theory suggests that the
> >> restriction on knowledge should take a particular form,
> >> namely, that one抯 knowledge be quantitatively equal to
> >> one抯 ignorance in a state of maximal knowledge.
>
> >>
> >> It is important to bear in mind that one cannot derive
> >> quantum theory from the toy theory, nor from any
> >> simple modification thereof. The problem is that the
> >> toy theory is a theory of incomplete knowledge about
> >> local and noncontextual hidden variables, and it is well
> >> known that quantum theory cannot be understood in this
> >> way [28, 30, 31]. This prompts the obvious question: if
> >> a quantum state is a state of knowledge, and it is not
> >> knowledge of local and noncontextual hidden variables,
> >> then what is it knowledge about? We do not at present
> >> have a good answer to this question.
> >>
> >>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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-- 
Alberto.

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